United Nations S/2013/568

Security Council

Distr.: General
23 September 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 19 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT), I would like to welcome the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2013/515) and emphasize the importance of the efforts of Argentina in chairing the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions.

ACT is a cross-regional group of 22 States aiming at enhancing the effectiveness of the Security Council through the improvement of its working methods. Our members include Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Maldives, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania and Uruguay.

ACT commends all members of the Informal Working Group for their work leading to the adoption on 28 August of the aforementioned presidential note on enhancing efficiency and transparency as well as on the interaction and dialogue with non-Security Council members and bodies. ACT considers the note to be a further important step in enhancing the transparency of the Council's work and its interaction with the wider membership. The 10-point list to which the members of the Council commit themselves is of utmost relevance. Some of the points mentioned in the note are also part of priority measures advocated by ACT on Council working methods. In particular, ACT welcomes the commitments to more effective use of public meetings, to invite the Peacebuilding Commission Chairs to formal Council meetings and informal interactive dialogues, and to improve consultations with troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries, as well as to continue to provide opportunities to hear the views of the broader membership on the working methods of the Council, including through open debates on the implementation of the note by the President contained in document S/2010/507.

Regarding paragraph 2 (i) in document S/2013/515, ACT welcomes the use of wrap-up meetings and informal briefing sessions by the Security Council and presidents pursuant to the note by the President contained in document S/2012/922. It also welcomes the commitment reiterated by Council members to continue this practice and encourages all efforts to sustain and improve these sessions, which are of great relevance to the broader membership. ACT remains committed to contributing to the enhancement of this tool as well as to the overall discussion

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regarding working methods and interaction between the Council and the wider membership.

ACT looks forward to working constructively with Security Council members, including with the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, on continuing to improve working methods and will in the coming weeks and months discuss and convey relevant suggestions to the Council in this regard.

I would be grateful if you could circulate the present letter to the members of the Security Council and have it issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Paul **Seger**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2013/569

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 September 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2098 (2013), in which the Council requested that I submit a report on the implementation of the commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region.[1] The report covers developments since the issuance of my last report of 28 June 2013 (S/2013/387) and describes recent peace and security initiatives in relation to eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Furthermore, the report discusses progress in the implementation of the Framework, including the development of regional benchmarks and appropriate follow-up measures, as referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution.

II. Recent developments

2. In spite of continuous efforts and political initiatives, the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has deteriorated, with renewed fighting between the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) and a number of other armed groups.

3. In the most worrisome development since the signing of the Framework in February, major fighting erupted between FARDC and M23 in July and August. Following three days of clashes in mid-July in Mutaho, North Kivu, which caused many civilian casualties, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) began to establish a security zone in the Goma-Sake area, on 30 July, to protect civilians. After a lull of three weeks, fighting erupted again between FARDC and M23 from 22 to 29 August. During that period, residential areas of Goma, as well as MONUSCO positions in

[1] In this context, region is defined as covering the 11 signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, namely, Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. In addition, the following four intergovernmental organizations act as guarantors for the Framework: the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Southern African Development Community and the United Nations. For further information, see S/2013/119 and S/2013/131, annex.

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the Munigi Hills, north of Goma, were shelled by M23. In the fighting, 8 civilians were killed, and at least 40 others were wounded. In addition, 1 peacekeeper from the United Republic of Tanzania was killed, and 14 peacekeepers from South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania sustained injuries. In accordance with the mandate of the Mission to protect civilians, the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade and other units of the Force responded to the attack by providing strong support to FARDC, which succeeded in dislodging M23 from its positions on the Munigi Hills. During the same period, artillery shells were fired into Rwanda, killing a civilian and causing serious injuries to a child. On 23 August, my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of MONUSCO, Martin Kobler, and the United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Flavia Pansieri, strongly condemned the targeting of civilian areas, during a joint press conference held in Goma. Meanwhile, scores of civilians demonstrated in Goma on 24 August to protest attacks by armed groups and demand MONUSCO intervention and protection. On 30 August, I issued a statement condemning the targeting of civilians and peacekeepers by M23, and reiterating the United Nations commitment to protecting civilians and holding violators of international law accountable. The period under review also saw attacks against civilians by the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), in the Bendera area of northern Katanga province, near the border with South Kivu province.

4. As a result of clashes between FARDC and various armed groups, the humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has remained alarming, raising serious protection concerns. Tens of thousands of people were newly displaced. The latest clashes between FARDC and M23, starting on 21 August in Kibati, north of Goma, posed a major risk to the populations living in the area. More than a dozen civilians were reportedly killed, and many others were injured when mortar rounds landed in and around Goma. Together, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces account for 65 per cent of the 2.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country, with over 1 million IDPs in North Kivu, as at 25 August, and an estimated 712,000 IDPs in South Kivu, as at 31 July. Furthermore, nearly 45,000 people were newly displaced in July alone in Pweto territory, Katanga province, owing to the activities of the local "Bakata Katanga" militia, including their clashes with FARDC. In the same vein, starting on 22 August, fighting in South Irumu Orientale province, between FARDC and the Forces de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI) displaced over 30,000 people.

5. The conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has also continued to have a severe regional impact, with thousands of Congolese refugees arriving in neighbouring countries over the reporting period. With these new arrivals, approximately 440,000 Congolese refugees are now living in neighbouring countries. Uganda experienced a significant influx in July 2013, as evidenced by over 66,000 Congolese nationals crossing into the country, especially after intense fighting between FARDC and the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU) rebel group in Beni territory (North Kivu). Uganda is currently the largest recipient of Congolese refugees, hosting approximately 150,000 people. New Congolese refugees also arrived in Burundi and, to a lesser extent, in Rwanda. As at 31 July, Burundi was host to some 45,000 refugees, as well as approximately 79,000 IDPs. Other host countries to Congolese refugees in the region included the United Republic of Tanzania (63,000), the Republic of Congo (44,300), South Sudan (18,500), Zambia (15,000),

the Central African Republic (13,000) and Angola (7,000). On a related note, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is host to nearly 180,000 refugees from other countries in the region. This figure includes over 40,000 refugees from the Central African Republic, who have arrived in the Equator and Orientale provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo since December 2012.

6. While long-running and well-established, the large-scale humanitarian response in the region has continued to face serious challenges. Efforts to deliver life-saving assistance to people in need have been hindered by the resumption of fighting around Goma and in other areas. As a result of the deterioration of the humanitarian situation over the past 18 months, resources and capacities for life-saving activities and alleviation of human suffering are now severely stretched across all sectors, leaving hundreds of thousands of persons without assistance.

7. The number of reported violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by M23 increased during the period under review. Separately, allegations of serious mistreatment of prisoners and mutilation of corpses of M23 combatants by FARDC and the Congolese national police were reported between 14 and 16 July. There were also numerous reports of killings, wounding and forceful recruitment by M23, including the recruitment of children. In North Kivu alone, the United Nations Children's Fund estimates that 2,000 children are currently associated with armed groups. In Katanga province, about 400 children were recently demobilized from the local "Bakata Katanga" militia.

8. There was a surge in the number of incidents of sexual violence against civilians committed by M23. A Human Rights Watch report, released on 22 July, claimed that M23 had forcefully recruited children, summarily executed at least 44 people, and raped at least 61 women and girls since March 2013. Furthermore, as at 30 July, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection monitoring teams had registered 705 cases of sexual violence, including 619 cases of rape, since January. This figure represents a significant increase from the 108 cases recorded during the same period last year.

9. The resumption of hostilities between FARDC and M23 has led to an increase in diplomatic tensions in the region. On 8 July, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Rwanda, Louise Mushikiwabo, addressed a letter to the Security Council, alleging that MONUSCO military commanders held contacts and shared information with FDLR elements. Both the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO officials denied those allegations. On 20 August, Mrs. Mushikiwabo wrote me a letter to provide further information regarding the allegations contained in her aforementioned letter to the Security Council. She also expressed concern over what she described as an "unhealthy collaboration" between FARDC and FDLR. In a related development, on 15 July, the Government of Rwanda denounced what it described as deliberate shelling of Rwandan territory, reportedly originating from an area controlled by FARDC and MONUSCO in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo denied the shelling. MONUSCO also rejected the allegations and indicated that it had not fired any weapon on that day. MONUSCO further encouraged the Government of Rwanda to work through the Goma-based Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism to investigate the incident. During the clashes between FARDC and M23 from 22 to 29 August, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda traded accusations of deliberately shelling their respective territories.

Various diplomatic initiatives were undertaken by the United Nations and the international community to help reduce mounting tensions between the two neighbours. Shortly before the joint visit of my Special Envoy and other Envoys to the region, my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo visited Kigali for an exchange of views with the Rwandan authorities.

10. In July, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo issued an arrest and extradition warrant for M23 leader Lieutenant Colonel Eric Badege. This followed the issuance, earlier in May, of arrest warrants for the former Chairman of M23, Jean-Marie Runiga, and two military commanders, Colonel Baudouin Ngaruye and Colonel Innocent Zimurinda, who fled to Rwanda following the internal split within M23 in March 2013. The four are accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity and the creation of an insurrectional movement. They are also listed by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004). Other prominent M23 members may also be responsible for human rights violations, and some may be liable for judicial action in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

11. On 19 July, the Group of Experts assisting the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) submitted its interim report to the Committee. The Group reported that M23 had continued to receive limited support from within the territory of Rwanda. The Government of Rwanda strongly denied any collaboration with M23. The Group also documented local-level collaboration between FARDC and FDLR.

12. Progress in the Kampala Dialogue between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and M23 was limited during the reporting period. On 12 July, the Minister of Defence of Uganda and Facilitator of the talks, Dr. Crispus Kiyonga, submitted the second version of a draft agreement based on inputs from both parties. While the draft reflected some progress in the talks, it still required further negotiations and refinement, particularly on three critical points that remained contentious, namely, integration, disarmament and amnesty for M23 members. It should be noted that the United Nations is against the granting of amnesties to alleged perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or gross violations of human rights, in accordance with international law standards, as explained in the 2006 Guidelines for United Nations Representatives on Certain Aspects of Negotiations for Conflict Resolution. In March 2013, MONUSCO conveyed this message to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which, in turn, expressed its opposition to amnesty for the perpetrators of serious crimes under international law and serious human rights violations.

13. The sixth extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region was held in Nairobi, on 31 July. In her opening remarks, my Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Mary Robinson, stressed the role of the Conference as guarantor of the Framework and highlighted the timeliness of the summit. In the declaration issued at the end of the summit, the Heads of State renewed their commitment to the Framework and stressed the need to work collaboratively in order to find lasting solutions to the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region. They reaffirmed their support to the Kampala Dialogue and requested my Special Envoy, my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Special Representative of the African Union Commission for the Great Lakes Region, Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, and the Special Envoy of the United States to the Great

Lakes region, Russell Feingold, to assist the process. This request followed a similar call by Ministers of the region, at an informal meeting held in New York on 25 July. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region summit further commended the work of the Technical Support Committee, which had been developing the benchmarks for the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, under the auspices of my Special Envoy and the Special Representative of the African Union for the Great Lakes region. Finally, the summit called for greater collaboration between MONUSCO and regional security and political mechanisms, such as the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism.

14. Also during the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region summit, the Governments of Kenya and the Sudan expressed interest in joining the Framework. In the declaration that followed the summit, the Conference leaders requested the United Nations to consider their request. Consequently, following consultations with the African Union, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Kenya and the Sudan were invited to participate in the next meeting of the Regional Oversight Mechanism, which took place in New York on 23 September.

15. Other regional efforts have also supported the implementation of the Framework. The thirty-third Summit of the Heads of State and Government of SADC, held in Lilongwe on 17 and 18 August, reiterated the support of the region for the Framework and commended the adoption of Security Council resolution 2098 (2013). The SADC summit commended the Kampala Dialogue between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and M23, while noting that the talks had become protracted and a reasonable deadline should be considered. SADC leaders also urged all Congolese stakeholders to participate in the forthcoming national dialogue in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

16. In response to the renewed fighting between FARDC and M23, President Museveni of Uganda convened the seventh extraordinary summit of the Heads of State and Government of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, held in Kampala, on 5 and 6 September. The summit was well attended, notably by Presidents Kabila, Kagame, Kikwete and Kiir. In the margins of the summit, President Museveni met his peers in closed-door consultations to discuss the issues that had hindered the Kampala Dialogue and triggered the latest round of fighting. Topics discussed included the cessation of hostilities, amnesty, integration, the disarmament of M23 and the fate of the top leadership of M23. My Special Envoy attended these consultations and encouraged the leaders to take a principled approach, noting the United Nations policy against amnesty and integration for the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, war crimes and other human rights abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence. There were also some bilateral meetings, notably between President Kagame and President Kikwete. During that meeting, the two leaders discussed ways to ease growing tensions between their countries over the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

17. The extraordinary summit (i) strongly condemned the recent bombings in the Goma area and in Rwanda and tasked the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism to investigate the attacks and report back; (ii) directed the parties to the Kampala Dialogue to resume the talks within 3 days and conclude them within a period of 14 days; (iii) urged M23 to end its military activities and threats to overthrow the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; (iv) decided to continue

exerting pressure on M23 and all other negative forces in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, in collaboration with the Force Intervention Brigade; (v) accepted the request by MONUSCO to have permanent representation within the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism; (vi) requested MONUSCO to provide logistical support to the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism; (vii) requested the United Nations to find an urgent solution for the former M23 combatants interned in eastern Rwanda since March 2013; and (viii) accepted the proposal of the SADC summit of 17 and 18 August to convene a joint SADC/International Conference on the Great Lakes Region summit on the Great Lakes region.

III. Activities of the Special Envoy

18. During the reporting period, my Special Envoy undertook consultations with regional leaders, international stakeholders and civil society groups, with the aim of advancing the implementation of the commitments stipulated in the Framework.

19. On 25 July, Special Envoy Robinson convened a ministerial meeting, in the margins of the high-level debate of the Security Council on the Great Lakes region. In attendance were Ministers from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and South Africa, and the United States Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and my Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB). Representatives of the African Union Commission, the European Union and SADC were also in attendance. Participants reiterated their support to the Framework and called for an end to hostilities in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. There was also recognition that the Kampala Dialogue should be concluded to de-escalate tensions and ease the suffering of those affected by the fighting. To this end, Special Envoy Robinson, Special Representative Kobler and United States Special Envoy Feingold were requested to assist the Kampala Dialogue. This request was later endorsed by the Heads of State and Government of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, at the sixth extraordinary summit held in Nairobi on 31 July.

20. My Special Envoy also undertook several visits to countries in and around the Great Lakes region, notably Burundi, Kenya and South Africa. In Burundi, she and President Pierre Nkurunziza discussed Burundi's experience with security sector reform, as well as various issues related to the Framework. She also visited Pretoria on 27 July and met with South Africa President Jacob Zuma and the South Africa Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Koana-Mashabane. In Kenya, her discussions with President Uhuru Kenyatta and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Amina Mohamed included Kenya's request to join the Framework.

21. During and after the fighting in Mutaho, between FARDC and M23, my Special Envoy held telephone conversations with Presidents Kabila, Kagame and Kikwete. She encouraged the leaders to do everything in their power to restore calm and prevent the situation from deteriorating further. Likewise, during and after the second round of fighting near Goma, in late August, my Special Envoy urged all actors to observe maximum restraint, protect civilians and refrain from any action that could cause a further escalation of violence. Through these consultations, Special Envoy Robinson sought support to ease growing tensions, resolve the impasse in the Kampala Dialogue and advance the development of benchmarks and progress indicators for the Framework.

22. Special Envoy Robinson also travelled to Brussels on 11 July and met with senior officials from the European Union, including the Commissioner for Development. She urged them to prioritize their engagement in the Great Lakes region, especially in the area of security sector reform. She also underlined the need for improved donor alignment to increase the efficiency of international support to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to make peace dividends more tangible. My Special Envoy also held consultations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Didier Reynders, and the Minister for Development and Cooperation of Belgium, Jean-Pascal Labille, to encourage multilateral and bilateral assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

23. Following the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region summit of 31 July, my Special Envoy and her colleagues intensified consultations with regional leaders to determine how best to support political initiatives, including the Kampala Dialogue. The team of my Special Envoy travelled to Brazzaville, Kinshasa, Kampala and Kigali, where her Special Adviser met with senior army and intelligence officers, political officials and the MONUSCO leadership. They discussed the stalemate in the Kampala Dialogue, as well as other political and security matters. These included preparations for the National Dialogue in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, activities of the Force Intervention Brigade, and growing diplomatic tensions between Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania.

24. Together with my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United States Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, the African Union Special Representative of the African Union Commission for the Great Lakes, and the European Union Senior Coordinator for the Great Lakes region, Koen Vervaeke, my Special Envoy undertook a joint visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. The visit was initially planned for mid-September; however, in the light of the deteriorating situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Envoys decided to advance their trip. The visit was intended to help reduce tensions in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, bring the Kampala Dialogue to a swift conclusion, and boost the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework.

25. The joint visit started in Kinshasa on 4 September, where the Envoys met with President Kabila, Prime Minister Matata, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Speakers of the Parliament and Senate, representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council and representatives of the donor community. The Envoys encouraged the Congolese authorities to accelerate the pace of reforms in order to meet their national commitments under the Framework, especially in the areas of security and governance. The delegation also encouraged the Government to re-engage in, and swiftly conclude, the Kampala Dialogue. The Envoys and the Congolese authorities agreed on a principled approach regarding the issues of amnesty and integration for M23. They also discussed the need for a broader political process to address the root causes of instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this regard, they welcomed the National Dialogue and stressed that the consultations should be inclusive and produce tangible outcomes. On 6 September, the delegation travelled to Goma, where they met with the Force Commander of MONUSCO, as well as representatives of international organizations and NGOs. They reviewed the security and humanitarian situation and commended MONUSCO for assisting FARDC in protecting civilians. The Envoys also undertook a field trip to the Mugunga III refugee camp.

26. On 5 September, my Special Envoy and her colleagues travelled to Kampala, where they held separate consultations with regional leaders, in the margins of the seventh extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. They discussed amnesty and integration, ways to conclude the Kampala Dialogue, the threat posed by FDLR and ADF-NALU and the worsening humanitarian crisis. The Envoys also noted the effectiveness of the Force Intervention Brigade during the latest clashes near Goma, the need to rebuild trust between the leaders of the region, and the necessity of strengthening the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism and its relationship with MONUSCO.

27. Continuing their joint visit, my Special Envoy and her colleagues travelled to Kigali, where they met with President Kagame and key Government ministers, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, and the Director General of the National Intelligence and Security Services. While in Kigali, the Envoys noted the strong perception that some Governments in the region were backing negative forces, particularly M23 and FDLR. They noted that such support was a violation of the Framework. On a positive note, they welcomed the consensus within the region that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and M23 should resume their negotiations in Kampala. The delegation also discussed the importance of pursuing peace and development initiatives simultaneously, since the two objectives are mutually reinforcing. Lastly, the Envoys and the Rwandan authorities agreed that, in order to overcome the major challenges confronting them, the countries of the Great Lakes region should skilfully manage diversity and promote inclusiveness among all groups.

28. Underscoring her commitment to promote the role of women in peacemaking, Special Envoy Robinson also continued her active engagement with civil society groups, particularly women's groups, in line with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and Security Council resolution 2106 (2013), as well as other relevant resolutions. From 9 to 11 July, she organized a regional consultation on women, peace, security and development in the Great Lakes region in Bujumbura, in collaboration with Femmes Africa solidarité and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, with the support of BNUB. More than 100 women leaders from the Great Lakes region and signatory countries of the Framework attended the conference. These included the Gender Ministers of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. Subregional, regional and international organizations were also represented, as well as donor countries. Participants welcomed the consultation and expressed their readiness to support the implementation of the Framework. They also stressed, however, that they lacked resources to step up their engagement, particularly in the areas of monitoring and advocacy, as well as combating violence against women. Participants were given the opportunity to provide inputs to the development of benchmarks for the Framework, which were later shared with the Technical Support Committee. A key outcome of the meeting was the endorsement of the proposal of my Special Envoy to establish a communication platform, with a view to keeping donors informed about the mobilization and engagement of women in the region. The envisaged platform would also marshal technical expertise to support women's peace initiatives within the scope of the Framework.

IV. Implementation of the commitments made under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region

A. Commitments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

29. Under the chairmanship of the Presidents of the Senate and National Assembly, the National Dialogue began on 7 September and lasted two weeks. President Kabila had called for these consultations to build national cohesion, following the capture of Goma by M23 in November 2012. Some political and civil society figures had called on the international community to play a greater role in the dialogue. In this regard, President Sassou Nguesso of Congo had expressed his availability to act as facilitator, if requested.

30. While a large array of political parties and civil society representatives were in attendance, the main parties of the political opposition, in particular, Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS) and Union pour la nation congolaise (UNC), declined to participate in the proceedings, criticizing the format of the consultations. My Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo attended the opening ceremony.

31. Since the establishment of the National Oversight Mechanism in May, some progress was accomplished on the electoral front. For instance, following the establishment of the new Independent National Electoral Commission, an Electoral Partnership meeting was held in July, for the first time in over a year. Furthermore, the Government officially requested United Nations technical and logistical electoral assistance, including in relation to provincial and local elections. Modest progress was also recorded towards reforming the security sector, improving financial governance and extending State authority.

B. Commitments of the region

32. On 28 June, a technical colloquium on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration was held in Kinshasa, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in order to review funding, technical, legal and programmatic gaps that could be addressed under the Framework. The colloquium was attended by representatives of the Conference and donors. Participants agreed to establish a regional cooperation mechanism on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration at the technical-level, which will operate under the Framework.

33. Pursuant to the regional tour that I embarked upon with President Jim Yong Kim of the World Bank, on 18 and 19 July, the African Union, the United Nations and the World Bank co-organized a ministerial meeting on the theme "Regional approaches to development in countries of the Great Lakes in support of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework". The meeting was attended by Ministers of Finance and Economic Planning, and Ministers for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation from Great Lakes countries. Representatives of regional economic communities, partner countries, international organizations and civil society organizations were also in attendance. The meeting noted that enhanced regional economic cooperation and integration, and improved infrastructure and trade, could

foster economic inclusion and create opportunities, particularly for vulnerable groups, while strengthening political agreements. The meeting also identified a number of priority interventions in the region, notably in energy and transport infrastructure, agriculture, cross-border trade, economic development and the social sector. Further to the meeting, a mapping of regional priorities and areas of support was initiated. This will result in an action plan to strengthen collaboration and accelerate the implementation of regional development projects.

34. Another welcome initiative was the launch, on 25 July, of the joint mineral certification programme between the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The programme is a significant step towards stopping the illegal exploitation of minerals, eliminating fraud and preventing armed groups from benefiting from illegally exploited resources.

C. Development of benchmarks

35. Notable progress was made in the development of benchmarks and progress indicators for the Framework. Under the co-chairmanship of the United Nations and the African Union, the Technical Support Committee of the Regional Oversight Mechanism met three times in Nairobi. At those meetings, the Committee began by taking stock of gaps and challenges in the implementation of the 2006 Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region. It further recognized the importance of ongoing peace efforts such as the Kampala Dialogue; the Tripartite Framework between Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa; and the Oyo Quadripartite process, initiated by the Republic of Congo.

36. In line with its terms of reference, the Committee has focused on developing regional benchmarks, while also providing inputs to the national and international benchmarks. Drawing on consultations with international partners and civil society leaders, the Committee has articulated a set of benchmarks and indicators that are specific, measurable, achievable and time-bound, with a clear indication of responsibilities. The benchmarks place a strong focus on the promotion of peace, security and justice. They also include measures to fight impunity, create enabling conditions for the return of refugees, support cooperation in the exploitation of natural resources and promote economic cooperation in the region. The regional benchmarks were adopted by the Regional Oversight Mechanism, at its second meeting held on 23 September, on the margins of the General Assembly. In keeping with the mandate of my Special Envoy, a monitoring and evaluation mechanism will soon be established to ensure that the commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework are implemented and followed up regularly.

D. International commitments

37. As part of the development of international benchmarks and progress indicators, my Special Envoy has sought inputs from key international partners, including the International Contact Group on the Great Lakes Region, the World Bank and relevant entities within the United Nations system, particularly MONUSCO. In all of her contacts with international partners and donors, she encouraged them to coordinate their efforts in order to deliver tangible peace dividends. She also stressed the importance of reviving the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Conference, especially its agenda on economic development and

regional integration. In this regard, a summit of the Heads of State of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda is being envisaged to discuss regional trade.

V. Observations and recommendations

38. The Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework is widely perceived as a useful mechanism, given the opportunities that it presents for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region to effectively address decades of recurring conflict and violence. However, this "framework of hope" has yet to realize its objectives. Too many lives are being lost and disrupted while the leaders of the region muster the political will to implement the Framework. I call on all the signatories to accelerate their efforts, building on the positive steps that have been taken since the signing of the Framework, at the national, regional and international levels.

39. The resumption of hostilities between FARDC and M23 is a cause for serious concern. The renewed fighting dramatically increased the risk of a collapse of the political process and an escalation of violence. Tensions have flared in the region, both on the military and diplomatic fronts, and more concerted efforts are urgently needed to overcome the daunting challenges at hand.

40. The renewed fighting in North Kivu demonstrates that there are immediate issues that must be addressed in order to create the necessary conditions for the political process to succeed. In this regard, I am encouraged by the collective efforts undertaken by the leaders of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and SADC. I welcome and support the main recommendations of the SADC summit of 17 and 18 August, as well as those of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region summit of 5 September. In particular, I support the call for maximum restraint, the urgent resumption and conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue, and the enlargement and strengthening of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism.

41. The forthcoming joint SADC/International Conference on the Great Lakes Region summit could assist the member States of both organizations in reconciling their differences and reaching a common understanding on ways to bring lasting solutions to the challenges in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. My Special Envoy will continue to work closely with the leaders of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and SADC, as well as the Facilitator of the Dialogue. Moreover, my Special Envoy and my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo will continue to work closely towards a balanced approach that builds on the combined strengths of political negotiations and military pressure.

42. I am concerned about the unacceptably high toll that the recent outbreak of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has inflicted on civilians. Once again, I condemn the attacks on civilians and MONUSCO peacekeepers, including the personnel of the Force Intervention Brigade. I would like to express my deepest condolences to the families of the civilians and soldiers killed during the recent fighting. In the light of the grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law perpetrated by M23, I would like to remind all concerned of their commitment, under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, to neither harbour nor provide protection to individuals accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, acts of genocide or crimes of aggression, as well as individuals falling under the United Nations sanctions regime. Furthermore, given the numerous

reports of human rights violations allegedly committed by the Congolese defence and security forces, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should intensify its efforts to tackle impunity and promote respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.

43. While the recent outbreak of conflict must be contained and tensions eased, we must continue efforts to tackle the root causes of the conflict, as identified in the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. At the national level, I am encouraged by the initiatives taken by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, it is essential that the National Oversight Mechanism become fully operational as soon as possible. Furthermore, while I welcome the opening of the National Dialogue in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I regret that several opposition parties have refused to participate. I urge the Congolese authorities to foster an inclusive process that strengthens national cohesion. In this regard, I welcome the willingness of President Sassou Nguesso of Congo to facilitate the process, if requested. The United Nations stands ready to support the national dialogue, in accordance with the mandates of my Special Envoy and my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

44. I welcome the positive steps taken at the regional level, particularly the development of benchmarks and indicators of progress for the implementation of the Framework. These benchmarks constitute a baseline; however, it is critical to quickly identify priority measures that will reduce tensions, build confidence among stakeholders and make peace dividends more tangible. My Special Envoy will lead efforts in this regard by proposing key steps that the countries of the region can take with international support. This is part of the strategic road map for the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, which my Special Envoy is currently developing and will present to the Security Council in the fourth quarter of 2013.

45. The success of the Framework requires the unified and sustained engagement of the international community. In this regard, I welcome the efforts of the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and SADC to address the immediate crisis, while intensifying efforts to implement the Framework. My Special Envoy will continue to work closely with the guarantors of the Framework, building on existing regional initiatives where relevant.

46. The support of bilateral and multilateral partners is also crucial to maximize the opportunities described in the Framework. I count on the backing of international stakeholders to keep the process on track, support confidence-building measures and fulfil the commitments made under the Framework. I also request the donor community to maximize support for economic integration and development in the region, in close collaboration with my Special Envoy.

47. I would like to thank my Special Envoy, Mary Robinson, and her Special Adviser, Modibo Touré, for their tireless efforts. My Special Envoy and my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo will continue to work closely to assist the Congolese authorities in implementing their commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. I trust that international partners, particularly the members of the Security Council, and the United Nations country teams in the region will continue to support my Special Envoy as she implements her mandate.

United Nations S/2013/570

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 September 2013

Original: English

Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Germany, Guatemala, Japan, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, and noting the significance of small arms and light weapons as the most frequently used weapons in the majority of recent armed conflicts,

Recalling the statements of its President of 19 March 2010 (S/PRST/2010/6), of 14 January 2009 (S/PRST/2009/1), of 29 June 2007 (S/PRST/2007/24), of 17 February 2005 (S/PRST/2005/7), of 19 January 2004 (S/PRST/2004/1), of 31 October 2002 (S/PRST/2002/30), of 31 August 2001 (S/PRST/2001/21) and of 24 September 1999 (S/PRST/1999/28), as well as other relevant resolutions of the Council, including that of 16 September 1998 (S/RES/1196 (1998)) and statements of its President related to small arms and light weapons,

Emphasizing that the right of individual and collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and the legitimate security demands of all countries should be fully taken into account, and *recognizing* that small arms and light weapons are traded, manufactured and retained by States for legitimate security, sporting and commercial considerations,

Gravely concerned that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world continue to pose threats to international peace and security, cause significant loss of life, contribute to instability and insecurity and continue to undermine the effectiveness of the Security Council in discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recognizing that threats arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons may vary according to national, regional and subregional circumstances and *encouraging* responses that address prevailing needs and challenges,

Recognizing the importance of capacity-building to address threats arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and

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light weapons, especially in Africa, *welcoming* efforts that have been made by States, international, regional and subregional organizations to tackle this scourge, and *strongly encouraging* support for such efforts,

Emphasizing the importance of assisting Member States as well as, intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations in capacity-building to prevent and address the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons,

Recalling with concern the close connection between international terrorism, transnational organized crime, drugs trafficking, money-laundering, other illicit financial transactions, illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons and arms trafficking, and the link between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as a major factor fuelling and exacerbating many conflicts,

Expressing concern at the continuing threats posed by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons to the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers and their effectiveness in implementing peacekeeping mandates, and to the safety and security of humanitarian workers and their effective provision of humanitarian assistance,

Recalling with grave concern that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons fuel armed conflicts and have a wide range of negative human rights, humanitarian, development and socioeconomic consequences, in particular on the security of civilians in armed conflict, including the disproportionate impact on violence perpetrated against women and girls, and exacerbating sexual and gender-based violence and the recruitment and use of children by parties to armed conflict in violation of applicable international law,

Noting that this resolution focuses on the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, including in respect of Council-mandated arms embargoes,

Acknowledging the important contribution of Council-mandated arms embargoes in countering the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons, mitigating the intensity of conflict and creating conditions conducive to the peaceful resolution of situations that threaten or breach international peace and security, and *acknowledging also* the contribution Council-mandated arms embargoes make in supporting conflict prevention, post-conflict peacebuilding, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform,

Recognizing the value of effective physical security and management of stockpiles of small arms, light weapons and ammunition as an important means to prevent the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, in accordance with global and regional standards, including through the application of voluntary guidelines, such as the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) developed under the UN Safer*G*uard programme, and the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) in arms and ammunition stockpile management practices,

Emphasizing the importance of addressing the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in conflict prevention and

post-conflict peacebuilding, and in this context, *stressing* the importance of comprehensive international, regional and national approaches to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration that integrates political, social, economic, development and security aspects, and provides for the special needs of children and women, and women's full and effective participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, in line with UNSCR 1325 (S/RES/1325 (2000)),

Underlining the responsibility of States to prevent threats posed by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons to international peace and security, and the devastating impact on civilians in armed conflict,

Recognizing that the misuse of small arms and light weapons has resulted in grave crimes and *reaffirming* therefore the relevant provisions of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the protection of civilians in armed conflict, including paragraphs 138 and 139 thereof regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,

Noting with appreciation the efforts made by Member States, intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations in addressing threats to international peace and security posed by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, and *noting* the significant role of civil society in supporting such efforts,

Underlining in this regard the importance of cooperation, coordination and information-sharing among actors in addressing threats to international peace and security posed by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons,

Recognizing the significance and central role of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, including the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition; the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, as crucial instruments in countering the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons,

Acknowledging the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty, *taking note* of the signature and ratification of the Treaty by some States, and *looking forward to* the important contribution it can make to international and regional peace, security and stability, reducing human suffering and promoting cooperation,

Welcoming the increased cooperation between the United Nations and INTERPOL, including the 2009 Supplementary Agreement between INTERPOL and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as well as individual agreements between INTERPOL and Council Sanctions Committees, which provide better optional tools including, those for weapons identification and information sharing, for the United Nations and Member States to implement Council-mandated arms embargoes more effectively,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's report to the Council of 22 August 2013 entitled "Small Arms" (S/2013/503),

Being determined to continue to take practical steps to prevent the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, including in support of other ongoing efforts and processes,

1. *Welcomes efforts made* by Member States, regional and subregional organizations in addressing the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, and *encourages* the establishment or strengthening, where appropriate, of subregional and regional cooperation, coordination and information sharing mechanisms, in particular, transborder customs cooperation and networks for information-sharing, with a view to preventing, combating, and eradicating illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons;

2. *Reminds* Member States of their obligation to fully and effectively comply with Council-mandated arms embargoes and to take appropriate measures, including all legal and administrative means against any activity that violates such arms embargoes, and including, in accordance with relevant Council resolutions, through cooperating with all relevant United Nations entities; by making available to relevant sanctions committees all pertinent information on any alleged violations of arms embargoes; by acting on credible information to prevent the supply, sale, transfer or export of small arms and light weapons in contravention of Council-mandated arms embargoes; by facilitating unhindered access by relevant Council-mandated personnel in accordance with Council mandates; and by applying relevant international standards such as the International Tracing Instrument;

3. *Calls on* Member States subject to Council-mandated arms embargoes to implement and enforce the embargo, including by, as mandated, avoiding diversion of state owned or controlled weapons by enhancing small arms and light weapon stockpile security, accountability and management; improving the monitoring of small arms and light weapons that are supplied in accordance with exemptions to arms embargoes; and ensuring that seized, confiscated or surrendered small arms, light weapons and ammunition are recorded and disposed of in an appropriate manner, and by implementing national weapons marking programmes in accordance with the International Tracing Instrument;

4. *Reiterates that* United Nations peacekeeping operations and other relevant Council-mandated entities, located in a Member State or region with a Council-mandated arms embargo, may, if deemed necessary by the Council, assist with appropriate expertise the host government, relevant sanctions committee and relevant experts group, with the implementation and compliance monitoring of that arms embargo;

5. *Reiterates that* such peacekeeping operations and relevant Council-mandated entities may, if deemed necessary by the Council, assist in capacity-building for host governments, as requested, to implement commitments under existing global and regional instruments and to address the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, including inter alia through weapons collection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes, enhancing physical security and stockpile management practices, record keeping and tracing capacities,

development of national export and import control systems, enhancement of border security, and strengthening judicial institutions and law enforcement capacity;

6. *Reaffirms its responsibility* to monitor the implementation of Council-mandated arms embargoes and *reaffirms its intention* to take appropriate measures, when needed, to strengthen arms embargo monitoring mechanisms including inter alia through assigning dedicated staff or monitoring units to relevant United Nations Missions to effectively monitor arms embargoes;

7. *Encourages* information-sharing between groups of experts, peacekeeping missions within their mandates and other relevant United Nations entities on possible arms embargo violations, including on illicit arms transfers, illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons, illicit financial activities, suspected traffickers and trafficking routes;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to direct that any relevant United Nations agencies operating in a State or region in relation to which the Council maintains an arms embargo provide the utmost assistance to the work of relevant sanctions committees, experts groups, peacekeeping operations and other relevant United Nations entities in the implementation and compliance monitoring of that arms embargo;

9. *Reaffirms* its decision that States shall eliminate the supply of weapons, including small arms and light weapons, to terrorists, as well as its calls for States to find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information regarding traffic in arms, and to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels;

10. *Urges* Member States, relevant United Nations entities, intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations, in a position to do so and where appropriate, to cooperate and share information on suspected traffickers and trafficking routes, suspect financial transactions and brokering activities for, or diversions of, small arms or light weapons, and other information relevant to the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation or misuse of small arms and light weapons, with potentially affected States and with relevant United Nations entities, including experts groups assisting sanctions committees and peacekeeping operations;

11. *Calls for Member States* to support weapons collection, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as physical security and stockpile management programmes by United Nations peacekeeping operations where so mandated;

12. *Urges* Member States, United Nations entities, intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations, to take further measures to facilitate women's full and meaningful participation in all policymaking, planning and implementation processes to combat and eradicate the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and *calls upon*, in this regard, all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and justice and security sector reform efforts to take into account the particular needs of women and children associated with armed forces and armed groups, with the participation of women, and to provide for their full access to these programmes inter alia, through consultation with civil society, including women's organizations, as appropriate;

13. *Bearing in mind* that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons fuel conflict and impact on the protection of civilians, *reiterates its demand that* all parties to armed conflict comply strictly with the obligations applicable to them under international humanitarian, human rights law and refugee law, and *stresses* the need for parties to take all required measures to avoid civilian casualties, respect and protect the civilian population;

14. *Calls on* parties to armed conflict, in this regard, to comply with obligations under international humanitarian law to respect and protect humanitarian personnel, facilities and relief consignments, and to take measures to eradicate the negative impact of the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons on humanitarian actors, and take all required steps to facilitate the safe, rapid and unimpeded passage of relief consignments, equipment and personnel;

15. *Encourages* Member States and intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations in a position to do so to render assistance upon request in securing government stockpiles of small arms and light weapons, particularly through training in physical security and stockpile management and disposition of illicit or poorly secured small arms and light weapons in an appropriate manner in light of the important role that international assistance can play in supporting and facilitating efforts at the local, national, regional and global levels to prevent and address the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation or misuse of small arms and light weapons;

16. *Encourages* the Secretary-General and Heads of intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations to continue their efforts to strengthen their cooperation in addressing small arms and light weapons-related threats to international peace and security;

17. *Encourages* all Member States that have not yet done so to accede to and implement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, including the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunitions;

18. *Stresses* the need for full and effective implementation by States at the national, regional and international levels, of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, in particular, paying special attention to applying measures contained therein on the prevention of the diversion of small arms and light weapons, in order to make real progress in preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons;

19. *Urges* States to consider signing and ratifying the Arms Trade Treaty as soon as possible and *encourages* States, intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations that are in a position to do so to render assistance in capacity-building to enable States Parties to fulfil and implement the Treaty's obligations;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to submit to the Council on a biennial basis a report on small arms and light weapons, including on the implementation of this resolution, and affirms its intention to consider the report in a timely manner;

21. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations A/68/484–S/2013/571

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
30 September 2013
English
Original: Russian

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 35
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 24 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the situation in Syria and the surrounding area (see annex), adopted at the Organization's summit in Sochi on 23 September 2013.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vitaly **Churkin**

13-48701 (E) 011013 021013

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Annex to the identical letters dated 24 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement by the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the situation in Syria and the surrounding area

The States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization are seriously concerned by the development of the situation in Syria and the surrounding area. They call for the achievement of peace, stability, prosperity and progress in that country and in the whole of the Middle East region.

The States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization consider that external intervention, including by force, is unacceptable and may lead to even greater destabilization of the situation in the country and far beyond the region. In addition, any international intervention in the Syrian conflict which bypasses the United Nations Security Council and violates the Organization's charter is illegitimate.

The States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization support the efforts of the Russian Federation to achieve a settlement to the Syrian crisis exclusively through political and diplomatic means, and endorse the implementation of the Russian and United States proposals, agreed in Geneva from 12 to 14 September 2013, on measures relating to Syrian chemical weapons, believing that they will help to achieve the overall aim of eliminating all stocks of chemical weapons.

The States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization believe that the crisis must be resolved as rapidly as possible by the Syrian people themselves, with respect for the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic, an end to violence in the country, and the launch of broad political dialogue between the authorities and the opposition, without preconditions and on the basis of the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012.

The States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization support the efforts to convene an international conference to lay the foundation for reconciliation and normalization in Syria. They condemn decisively any manifestation of terrorism and any violence against a peaceful population, especially on the grounds of religion or nationality, and oppose illegitimate acts aimed at further militarization of the internal conflict in Syria.

Sochi, 23 September 2013

United Nations S/2013/572

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 September 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 25 September 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to transmit the attached letter, dated 23 September 2013, from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, conveying the quarterly report on the international security presence in Kosovo, covering the period from 1 April to 30 June 2013 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

13-48601 (E) 260913

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Annex

In accordance with paragraph 20 of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I attach a report on the operations of the Kosovo Force covering the period from 1 April to 30 June 2013 (see enclosure).

I would appreciate you making this report available to the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Anders Fogh **Rasmussen**

Enclosure

Report to the United Nations on the operations of the Kosovo Force

Introduction

1. The present report on the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is provided in accordance with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and covers the period from 1 April to 30 June 2013.

2. As at 30 June 2013, the total number of KFOR troops in theatre was approximately 5,000.

Security situation and operations

3. During the reporting period, the overall security situation in theatre remained calm, but still volatile in the northern part of Kosovo. KFOR contributed towards maintaining a safe and secure environment and ensuring freedom of movement in Kosovo. The implementation of the European Union-facilitated agreement on the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Priština of 19 April 2013 resulted in a series of peaceful demonstrations, none of which constituted a threat to either the safety and security of the environment or to freedom of movement in Kosovo. KFOR continues to effectively use situational awareness in order to be ready to rapidly deploy manoeuvre forces to defuse and manage potential crisis situations.

4. Movements of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) towards the crossing points at Gate 1 and DOG 31 were generally successful. On 20 June, EULEX successfully resumed land-based transport of Kosovo Police and customs officials to Gate 1. Throughout the reporting period, Kosovo Police and customs officials were transported to DOG 31 by helicopter. On average, there were a total of five daily EULEX convoys to Gate 1 and DOG 31.

5. A number of small explosions occurred during the reporting period in Kosovo. These explosions were, however, generally assessed to be isolated incidents, resulting from a mixture of criminal and personal motivations of people of various ethnicities.

6. No major incidents were reported in Kosovo during the celebration of Saint Vitus Day on 28 June.

7. During the reporting period, the transfer of responsibility for the security of the Peć Patriarchate in Peja/Peć from KFOR to the Kosovo Police continued. The Peć Patriarchate in Peja/Peć is the eighth designated special status property of the original nine properties to undergo this unfixing process.

Summary

8. During the reporting period, KFOR, in coordination with EULEX and the Kosovo Police, continued to contribute towards maintaining a safe and secure environment and to ensuring freedom of movement in Kosovo. While no major incident was reported, the situation in the northern part of Kosovo remained tense as the European Union-facilitated agreement on the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Priština of 19 April 2013 was being implemented. KFOR continues to monitor the security situation on the ground closely and maintains its deterrent posture to react quickly and decisively, as required.

United Nations S/2013/573

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 September 2013
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 24 September 2013 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a joint letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Libya, as Chair of the Council of the League of Arab States at the ministerial level, and the Secretary-General of the League (see annex). The letter sets out the Arab position on the current consultations regarding developments in the grave situation in Syria.

I should be grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex issued as an official document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ahmed **Fathalla**
Permanent Observer
of the League of Arab States to the United Nations

13-48643 (E) 260913 260913

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Annex to the letter dated 24 September 2013 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

We refer to our ongoing consultations with you regarding developments in the grave situation in Syria, and to the current consultations towards a Security Council resolution on the Syrian crisis and the means to implement the American-Russian agreement concerning the plan of action for Syrian chemical disarmament, which was agreed in Geneva on 14 September 2013. We should like to inform you that the Council of the League of Arab States met at the ministerial level on 23 September 2013 in New York. It discussed the dimensions of the Syrian crisis, its grave repercussions and the ongoing consultations on the subject. It decided as follows:

(i) To urge the Security Council to assume its responsibility by addressing the unfolding Syrian crisis and its repercussions in a comprehensive manner, not only by focusing on the effects of the Ghutah crime and Syrian chemical disarmament, but also by taking measures to impose a complete ceasefire on all Syrian territory; prohibiting the use of military aircraft, rockets and heavy weapons of all forms against civilians; establishing a mechanism to monitor the ceasefire under United Nations supervision; embarking on the process towards a political solution to the crisis; and building momentum for a second Geneva conference;

(ii) To stress that the Security Council should adopt a specific mechanism for the provision of humanitarian assistance, enabling international aid agencies to work freely and fulfil their functions without hindrance in all affected regions of Syria;

(iii) To stress that the chemical weapons crime in Ghutah was a war crime not subject to statutory limitations, and that its perpetrators must therefore be held accountable and handed over to the international criminal justice system.

(*Signed*) Mohamed **Abdulaziz**
Current Chair of the Council of the League

(*Signed*) Nabil **Elaraby**
Secretary-General of the League

United Nations A/68/488–S/2013/574

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
27 September 2013

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 34
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 26 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, dated 23 September 2013, on the illegal activities of the Russian occupation forces along the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and the annex thereto circulated as a document of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kaha **Imnadze**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-48860 (E) 011013

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Annex to the identical letters dated 26 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the illegal activities of the Russian occupation forces along the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia condemns the continuous illegal activities of the Russian occupation forces along the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region in flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of international law and the commitments undertaken under the 12 August 2008 ceasefire agreement. After the resumption of the installation of barbed-wire fences in the village of Ditsi, Gori district, along the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region, the Russian occupation forces, since 22 September 2013, have intensively reactivated this illegal policy in the village of Dvani, Kareli district.

Unfortunately, the local population has again been prevented from accessing agricultural land and carrying out agricultural work. Despite an international call, the Russian Federation continues to blatantly violate the fundamental rights and freedoms of the population residing in the occupied territories and their vicinity, including, but not limited to, the rights to free movement, education in one's native language and other civil, economic and cultural rights.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia once again expresses its profound concern over the humanitarian consequences of the illegal activities of Russia along the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region and strongly stresses that Russia, as an occupying power, maintaining its illegal military presence within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia and exercising effective control over the Tskhinvali and Abkhazia regions of Georgia, bears responsibility under international law to desist from the violation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the population residing in the occupied regions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia calls upon partner States and international organizations to undertake appropriate and effective measures to immediately stop and reverse the illegal activities of Russia along the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia. The ongoing illegal activities of the Russian Federation and their humanitarian implications underscore the urgency of the establishment of international security and human rights monitoring mechanisms.

Tbilisi, 23 September 2013

United Nations S/2013/575

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 September 2013

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling the Statements of its President of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012, 5 April 2012, and its resolutions 1540 (2004), 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic,

Reaffirming that the proliferation of chemical weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling that the Syrian Arab Republic on 22 November 1968 acceded to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

Noting that on 14 September 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic deposited with the Secretary-General its instrument of accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Convention) and declared that it shall comply with its stipulations and observe them faithfully and sincerely, applying the Convention provisionally pending its entry into force for the Syrian Arab Republic,

Welcoming the establishment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (the Mission) pursuant to General Assembly resolution 42/37 C (1987) of 30 November 1987, and reaffirmed by resolution 620 (1988) of 26 August 1988, and *expressing* appreciation for the work of the Mission,

Acknowledging the report of 16 September 2013 (S/2013/553) by the Mission, *underscoring* the need for the Mission to fulfil its mandate, and *emphasizing* that future credible allegations of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic should be investigated,

Deeply outraged by the use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013 in Rif Damascus, as concluded in the Mission's report, *condemning* the killing of civilians that resulted from it, *affirming* that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law, and *stressing* that those responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable,

Recalling the obligation under resolution 1540 (2004) that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to

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develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and their means of delivery,

Welcoming the Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons dated 14 September 2013, in Geneva, between the Russian Federation and the United States of America (S/2013/565), with a view to ensuring the destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program in the soonest and safest manner, and *expressing* its commitment to the immediate international control over chemical weapons and their components in the Syrian Arab Republic,

Welcoming the decision of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of 27 September 2013 establishing special procedures for the expeditious destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program and stringent verification thereof, and *expressing* its determination to ensure the destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program according to the timetable contained in the OPCW Executive Council decision of 27 September 2013,

Stressing that the only solution to the current crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic is through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process based on the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012, and *emphasising* the need to convene the international conference on Syria as soon as possible,

Determining that the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Council's decisions,

1. *Determines* that the use of chemical weapons anywhere constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

2. *Condemns* in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular the attack on 21 August 2013, in violation of international law;

3. *Endorses* the decision of the OPCW Executive Council 27 September 2013, which contains special procedures for the expeditious destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program and stringent verification thereof and calls for its full implementation in the most expedient and safest manner;

4. *Decides* that the Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to other States or non-State actors;

5. *Underscores* that no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer chemical weapons;

6. *Decides* that the Syrian Arab Republic shall comply with all aspects of the decision of the OPCW Executive Council of 27 September 2013 (Annex I);

7. *Decides* that the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and the United Nations, including by complying with their relevant recommendations, by accepting personnel designated by the OPCW or the United Nations, by providing for and ensuring the security of activities undertaken by these personnel, by providing these personnel with immediate and unfettered access to

and the right to inspect, in discharging their functions, any and all sites, and by allowing immediate and unfettered access to individuals that the OPCW has grounds to believe to be of importance for the purpose of its mandate, and *decides* that all parties in Syria shall cooperate fully in this regard;

8. *Decides* to authorize an advance team of United Nations personnel to provide early assistance to OPCW activities in Syria, *requests* the Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General to closely cooperate in the implementation of the Executive Council decision of 27 September 2013 and this resolution, including through their operational activities on the ground, and *further requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Director-General of the OPCW and, where appropriate, the Director-General of the World Health Organization, to submit to the Council within 10 days of the adoption of this resolution recommendations regarding the role of the United Nations in eliminating the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program;

9. *Notes* that the Syrian Arab Republic is a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, *decides* that OPCW-designated personnel undertaking activities provided for in this resolution or the decision of the OPCW Executive Council of 27 September 2013 shall enjoy the privileges and immunities contained in the Verification Annex, Part II(B) of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and *calls* on the Syrian Arab Republic to conclude modalities agreements with the United Nations and the OPCW;

10. *Encourages* Member States to provide support, including personnel, technical expertise, information, equipment, and financial and other resources and assistance, in coordination with the Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General, to enable the OPCW and the United Nations to implement the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program, and *decides* to authorize Member States to acquire, control, transport, transfer and destroy chemical weapons identified by the Director-General of the OPCW, consistent with the objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to ensure the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program in the soonest and safest manner;

11. *Urges* all Syrian parties and interested Member States with relevant capabilities to work closely together and with the OPCW and the United Nations to arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission, recognizing the primary responsibility of the Syrian government in this regard;

12. *Decides* to review on a regular basis the implementation in the Syrian Arab Republic of the decision of the OPCW Executive Council of 27 September 2013 and this resolution, and *requests* the Director-General of the OPCW to report to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, who shall include relevant information on United Nations activities related to the implementation of this resolution, within 30 days and every month thereafter, and *requests* further the Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General to report in a coordinated manner, as needed, to the Security Council, non-compliance with this resolution or the OPCW Executive Council decision of 27 September 2013;

13. *Reaffirms* its readiness to consider promptly any reports of the OPCW under Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides for the referral of cases of non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council;

14. *Decides* that Member States shall inform immediately the Security Council of any violation of resolution 1540 (2004), including acquisition by non-State actors of chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials in order to take necessary measures therefore;

15. *Expresses* its strong conviction that those individuals responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic should be held accountable;

16. *Endorses* fully the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 (Annex II), which sets out a number of key steps beginning with the establishment of a transitional governing body exercising full executive powers, which could include members of the present Government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent;

17. *Calls* for the convening, as soon as possible, of an international conference on Syria to implement the Geneva Communiqué, and *calls upon* all Syrian parties to engage seriously and constructively at the Geneva Conference on Syria, and *underscores* that they should be fully representative of the Syrian people and committed to the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué and to the achievement of stability and reconciliation;

18. *Reaffirms* that all Member States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and *calls upon* all Member States, in particular Member States neighbouring the Syrian Arab Republic, to report any violations of this paragraph to the Security Council immediately;

19. *Demands* that non-State actors not develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and *calls upon* all Member States, in particular Member States neighbouring the Syrian Arab Republic, to report any actions inconsistent with this paragraph to the Security Council immediately;

20. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of chemical weapons, related equipment, goods and technology or assistance from the Syrian Arab Republic by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic;

21. *Decides*, in the event of non-compliance with this resolution, including unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;

22. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex I

OPCW Executive Council Decision

Decision on destruction of Syrian chemical weapons

The Executive Council,

Recalling that following its Thirty-Second Meeting, 27 March 2013, the Chairperson of the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") issued a statement (EC-M-32/2/Rev. 1, dated 27 March 2013) expressing "deep concern that chemical weapons may have been used in the Syrian Arab Republic," and underlining that "the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances would be reprehensible and completely contrary to the legal norms and standards of the international community";

Recalling also that the Third Review Conference (RC-3/3*, 19 April 2013) expressed "deep concern that chemical weapons may have been used in the Syrian Arab Republic and underlined that use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances would be reprehensible and completely contrary to the legal norms and standards of the international community";

Noting the "Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013," (S/2013/553, dated 16 September 2013) prepared by the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, dated 16 September 2013, which concludes that "chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, also against civilians, including children, on a relatively large scale";

Condemning in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons;

Welcoming the Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons agreed upon by the United States and the Russian Federation on 14 September 2013 (EC-M-33/NAT.1, dated 17 September 2013);

Noting also that on 12 September 2013, in its communication to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Syrian Arab Republic notified its intention to apply the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (hereinafter "the Convention") provisionally;

Noting further that on 14 September 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations its instrument of accession to the Convention and declared that it shall comply with its stipulations and observe them faithfully and sincerely, applying the Convention provisionally pending its entry into force for the Syrian Arab Republic, which was notified to all States Parties by the depositary on the same date (C.N.592.2013.TREATIES-XXVI.3), and taking into account that the depositary received no communications to the contrary from the States Parties with regard to this declaration;

Noting further that the Convention enters into force for the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 October 2013;

Recognising the extraordinary character of the situation posed by Syrian chemical weapons and determined to ensure that the activities necessary for the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons programme start immediately pending the formal entry into force of the Convention with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic, and are conducted in the most rapid and safe manner;

Recognising also the invitation of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to receive immediately a technical delegation from the OPCW and to cooperate with the OPCW in accordance with the provisional application of the Convention prior to its entry into force for the Syrian Arab Republic, and noting the designation by the Syrian Arab Republic to the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") of its National Authority;

Emphasising that the provisional application of the Convention gives immediate effect to its provisions with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic;

Noting further that the Syrian Arab Republic submitted on 19 September 2013 the detailed information, including names, types, and quantities of its chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location and form of storage, production, and research and development facilities;

Noting further that pursuant to paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the Convention, the Council, following its consideration of doubts or concerns regarding compliance and cases of non-compliance, shall, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, bring the issue or matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council;

Taking into account the Agreement Concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of 17 October 2000;

Strongly urging all remaining States not Party to the Convention to ratify or accede to it as a matter of urgency and without preconditions, in the interests of enhancing their own national security as well as contributing to global peace and security; and

Recalling that, pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article IV and paragraph 10 of Article V of the Convention, a State acceding to the Convention after 2007 shall destroy its chemical weapons and its chemical weapons production facilities as soon as possible, and the Council shall determine the "order of destruction and procedures for stringent verification" of such destruction;

Hereby:

1. Decides that the Syrian Arab Republic shall:

(a) not later than 7 days after the adoption of this decision, submit to the Secretariat further information, to supplement that provided on 19 September 2013, on the chemical weapons as defined in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Convention that the Syrian Arab Republic owns or possesses, or has under its jurisdiction or control, in particular:

(i) the chemical name and military designator of each chemical in its chemical weapons stockpile, including precursors and toxins, and quantities thereof;

(ii) the specific type of munitions, sub-munitions and devices in its chemical weapons stockpile, including specific quantities of each type that are filled and unfilled; and

(iii) the location of all of its chemical weapons, chemical weapons storage facilities, chemical weapons production facilities, including mixing and filling facilities, and chemical weapons research and development facilities, providing specific geographic coordinates;

(b) not later than 30 days after the adoption of this decision, submit to the Secretariat the declaration required by Article III of the Convention;

(c) complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014, subject to the detailed requirements, including intermediate destruction milestones, to be decided by the Council not later than 15 November 2013;

(d) complete as soon as possible and in any case not later than 1 November 2013, the destruction of chemical weapons production and mixing/filling equipment;

(e) cooperate fully with all aspects of the implementation of this decision, including by providing the OPCW personnel with the immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites in the Syrian Arab Republic;

(f) designate an official as the main point of contact for the Secretariat and provide him or her with the authority necessary to ensure that this decision is fully implemented.

2. Decides further that the Secretariat shall:

(a) make available to all States Parties, within five days of its receipt, any information or declaration referred to in this decision, which shall be handled in accordance with the Annex to the Convention on the Protection of Confidential Information;

(b) as soon as possible and in any case not later than 1 October 2013, initiate inspections in the Syrian Arab Republic pursuant to this decision;

(c) inspect not later than 30 days after the adoption of this decision, all facilities contained in the list referred to in paragraph 1 (a) above;

(d) inspect as soon as possible any other site identified by a State Party as having been involved in the Syrian chemical weapons programme, unless deemed unwarranted by the Director-General, or the matter resolved through the process of consultations and cooperation;

(e) be authorised to hire, on a short-term basis, qualified inspectors and other technical experts and to rehire, on a short-term basis, inspectors, other technical experts, and such other personnel as may be required whose term of service has recently expired, in order to ensure efficient and effective implementation of this decision in accordance with paragraph 44 of Article VIII of the Convention; and

(f) report to the Council on a monthly basis on implementation of this decision including progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of this decision and the Convention, activities carried out by

the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic, and its needs for any supplementary resources, particularly technical and personnel resources.

3. Decides further:

(a) to consider, on an urgent basis, the funding mechanisms for activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic, and to call upon all States Parties in a position to do so to provide voluntary contributions for activities carried out in the implementation of this decision;

(b) to meet within 24 hours if the Director-General reports delay by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of this decision or the Convention, including, inter alia, the cases referred to in paragraph 7 of Part II of the Annex to the Convention on Implementation and Verification, or a lack of cooperation in the Syrian Arab Republic or another problem that has arisen with regard to the implementation of this decision and at that meeting to consider whether to bring the matter, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the Convention;

(c) to remain seized of the matter; and

(d) to recognise that this decision is made due to the extraordinary character of the situation posed by Syrian chemical weapons and does not create any precedent for the future.

Annex II

Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué

30 June 2012

1. On 30 June 2012, the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Turkey, Iraq (Chair of the Summit of the League of Arab States), Kuwait (Chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the League of Arab States) and Qatar (Chair of the Arab Follow-up Committee on Syria of the League of Arab States) and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy met at the United Nations Office at Geneva as the Action Group for Syria, chaired by the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States to Syria.

2. The members of the Action Group came together out of grave alarm at the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. They strongly condemn the continued and escalating killing, destruction and human rights abuses. They are deeply concerned at the failure to protect civilians, the intensification of the violence, the potential for even deeper conflict in the country and the regional dimensions of the problem. The unacceptable nature and magnitude of the crisis demands a common position and joint international action.

3. The members of the Action Group are committed to the sovereignty, independence, national unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. They are determined to work urgently and intensively to bring about an end to the violence and human rights abuses, and to facilitate the launch of a Syrian-led political process leading to a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them independently and democratically to determine their own future.

4. In order to secure these common objectives, the members of the Action Group (a) identified steps and measures by the parties to secure the full implementation of the six-point plan and Security Council resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), including an immediate cessation of violence in all its forms; (b) agreed on principles and guidelines for a political transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people; and (c) agreed on actions that they would take to implement the objectives in support of the Joint Special Envoy's efforts to facilitate a Syrian-led political process. They are convinced that this can encourage and support progress on the ground and will help to facilitate and support a Syrian-led transition.

Identified steps and measures by the parties to secure the full implementation of the six-point plan and Security Council resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), including an immediate cessation of violence in all its forms

5. The parties must fully implement the six-point plan and Security Council resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012). To that end:

(a) All parties must recommit to a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms and to the implementation of the six-point plan immediately and

without waiting for the actions of others. The Government and armed opposition groups must cooperate with the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS), with a view to furthering the implementation of the plan in accordance with the Mission's mandate;

(b) A cessation of armed violence must be sustained, with immediate, credible and visible actions by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to implement the other items of the six-point plan, including:

(i) Intensification of the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities; the provision, without delay and through appropriate channels, of a list of all places in which such persons are being detained; the immediate organization of access to such locations; and the provision, through appropriate channels, of prompt responses to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons;

(ii) Ensuring freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them;

(iii) Respecting freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully, as legally guaranteed;

(c) In all circumstances, all parties must show full respect for the safety and security of UNSMIS and fully cooperate with and facilitate the Mission in all respects;

(d) In all circumstances, the Government must allow immediate and full humanitarian access by humanitarian organizations to all areas affected by the fighting. The Government and all parties must enable the evacuation of the wounded, and all civilians who wish to leave must be enabled to do so. All parties must fully adhere to their obligations under international law, including in relation to the protection of civilians.

Agreed principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led transition

6. The members of the Action Group agreed on the principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led transition set out below.

7. Any political settlement must deliver to the people of the Syrian Arab Republic a transition that:

(a) Offers a perspective for the future that can be shared by all in the Syrian Arab Republic;

(b) Establishes clear steps according to a firm timetable towards the realization of that perspective;

(c) Can be implemented in a climate of safety for all and of stability and calm;

(d) Is reached rapidly without further bloodshed and violence and is credible.

8. **Perspective for the future.** The aspirations of the people of the Syrian Arab Republic have been clearly expressed by the wide range of Syrians consulted. There is an overwhelming wish for a State that:

(a) Is genuinely democratic and pluralistic, giving space to established and newly emerging political actors to compete fairly and equally in elections. This also means that the commitment to multiparty democracy must be a lasting one, going beyond an initial round of elections;

(b) Complies with international standards on human rights, the independence of the judiciary, accountability of those in Government and the rule of law. It is not enough just to enunciate such a commitment. There must be mechanisms available to the people to ensure that these commitments are kept by those in authority;

(c) Offers equal opportunities and chances for all. There is no room for sectarianism or discrimination on ethnic, religious, linguistic or any other grounds. Numerically smaller communities must be assured that their rights will be respected.

9. **Clear steps in the transition.** The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic will end only when all sides are assured that there is a peaceful way towards a common future for all in the country. It is therefore essential that any settlement provide for clear and irreversible steps in the transition according to a fixed time frame. The key steps in any transition include:

(a) The establishment of a transitional governing body that can establish a neutral environment in which the transition can take place, with the transitional governing body exercising full executive powers. It could include members of the present Government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent;

(b) It is for the Syrian people to determine the future of the country. All groups and segments of society in the Syrian Arab Republic must be enabled to participate in a national dialogue process. That process must be not only inclusive but also meaningful. In other words, its key outcomes must be implemented;

(c) On that basis, there can be a review of the constitutional order and the legal system. The result of constitutional drafting would be subject to popular approval;

(d) Upon establishment of the new constitutional order, it will be necessary to prepare for and conduct free and fair multiparty elections for the new institutions and offices that have been established;

(e) Women must be fully represented in all aspects of the transition.

10. **Safety, stability and calm.** Any transition involves change. However, it is essential to ensure that the transition can be implemented in a way that ensures the safety of all in an atmosphere of stability and calm. This requires:

(a) Consolidation of full calm and stability. All parties must cooperate with the transitional governing body to ensure the permanent cessation of violence. This includes completion of withdrawals and addressing the issue of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups;

(b) Effective steps to ensure that vulnerable groups are protected and that immediate action is taken to address humanitarian issues in areas of need. It is also necessary to ensure that the release of the detained is completed rapidly;

(c) Continuity of governmental institutions and qualified staff. Public services must be preserved or restored. This includes the military forces and security

services. However, all governmental institutions, including the intelligence services, have to perform according to human rights and professional standards and operate under a leadership that inspires public confidence, under the control of the transitional governing body;

(d) Commitment to accountability and national reconciliation. Accountability for acts committed during the present conflict must be addressed. There also needs to be a comprehensive package for transitional justice, including compensation or rehabilitation for victims of the present conflict, steps towards national reconciliation and forgiveness.

11. **Rapid steps to come to a credible political agreement.** It is for the people of the Syrian Arab Republic to come to a political agreement, but time is running out. It is clear that:

(a) The sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic must be respected;

(b) The conflict must be resolved through peaceful dialogue and negotiation alone. Conditions conducive to a political settlement must now be put in place;

(c) There must be an end to the bloodshed. All parties must recommit themselves credibly to the six-point plan. This must include a cessation of armed violence in all its forms and immediate, credible and visible actions to implement points 2 to 6 of the six-point plan;

(d) All parties must now engage genuinely with the Joint Special Envoy. The parties must be prepared to put forward effective interlocutors to work expeditiously towards a Syrian-led settlement that meets the legitimate aspirations of the people. The process must be fully inclusive in order to ensure that the views of all segments of Syrian society are heard in shaping the political settlement for the transition;

(e) The organized international community, including the members of the Action Group, stands ready to offer significant support for the implementation of an agreement reached by the parties. This may include an international assistance presence under a United Nations mandate if requested. Significant funds will be available to support reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Agreed actions

12. Agreed actions that the members of the Group will take to implement the above in support of the Joint Special Envoy's efforts to facilitate a Syrian-led political process are as follows:

(a) Action Group members will engage as appropriate, and apply joint and sustained pressure on, the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic to take the steps and measures outlined in paragraph 5 above;

(b) Action Group members are opposed to any further militarization of the conflict;

(c) Action Group members emphasize to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic the importance of the appointment of an effective empowered interlocutor, when requested by the Joint Special Envoy to do so, to work on the basis of the six point plan and the present communiqué;

(d) Action Group members urge the opposition to increase cohesion and to be in a position to ensure effective representative interlocutors to work on the basis of the six-point plan and the present communiqué;

(e) Action Group members will give full support to the Joint Special Envoy and his team as they immediately engage the Government and the opposition, and will consult widely with Syrian society, as well as other international actors, to further develop the way forward;

(f) Action Group members would welcome the further convening by the Joint Special Envoy of a meeting of the Action Group, should he deem it necessary to review the concrete progress taken on all points agreed in the present communiqué and to determine what further and additional steps and actions are needed from the Action Group to address the crisis. The Joint Special Envoy will also keep the United Nations and the League of Arab States informed.

United Nations S/2013/576

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 December 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the representatives and deputies and alternate representatives of the members of the Security Council elected for the period 2014-2015

1. At its 34th plenary meeting, on 17 October 2013, the General Assembly elected Chad, Chile, Lithuania, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia as non-permanent members of the Security Council for a term of two years beginning on 1 January 2014. On 18 October 2013, Saudi Arabia declined its seat in the Security Council (A/68/599). On 6 December 2013, Jordan was elected as non-permanent member of the Security Council for a term of two years beginning on 1 January 2014.

2. Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that, with regard to the representation of the members of the Council elected for the period 2014-2015, he has received the communications referred to hereunder.

Chad: Credentials from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and African Integration, signed on 27 December 2013, stating that Mr. Mahamat Zène Chérif has been appointed representative of Chad on the Security Council, Mr. Bante Mangaral, Mr. Papouri Tchingonbé Patchanné, Mr. Eric Miangar, Ms. Madeleine Alingué and Mr. Letinan Makadjibé, deputy representatives, and Mr. Ahmat Ali Adoum, Mr. Adoum Koulbou Mahamat, Mr. Abdallah Bachar Bong, Mr. Amir Idriss Abdraman, Mr. Nourene Abderman Mahamat, Mr. Ali Mahamat Zène, Mr. Mohamed Mohamed Khchallah, Mr. Boukar Doungous, Mr. Ahmad Absakine Yérima and Mr. Hissein Oumar Seidou, alternate representatives.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

Chile: Credentials from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, signed on 17 December 2013, stating that Mr. Octavio Errázuriz has been appointed representative of Chile on the Security Council, Mr. Eduardo Gálvez, deputy representative, and Mr. Ignacio Llanos, Ms. Belén Sapag Muñoz de la Peña, Mr. Juan Pablo Espinoza, Mr. Diego Araya, Mr. Fernando Cabezas, Mr. José Antonio González, Mr. Máximo Venegas, Ms. Montserrat Macuer, Mr. Sang Yeob Kim and Mr. Ernesto González, alternate representatives.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

Jordan: Credentials from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of Jordan, signed on 26 December 2013, stating that Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein has been appointed representative of Jordan on the Security

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Council, Mr. Mahmoud Daifallah Mahmoud Hmoud and Mr. Eihab Omaish, deputy representatives, and Mr. Samer Naber, Mr. Mohammad Tal, Mr. Salah Tareq Salah Suheimat, Mr. Amjad Al-Moumani, Mr. Mohammad Tarawneh, Ms. Diana Al-Hadid, Mr. Adi Khair, Mr. Mohammad Albatayneh, Mr. Laith Obeidat, Brigadier General Mohammad Almhairat and Brigadier General Ibrahim Marji, alternate representatives.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

Lithuania: Credentials from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, signed on 12 December 2013, stating that Ms. Raimonda Murmokaitė has been appointed representative of Lithuania on the Security Council, Ms. Rita Kazragienė and Mr. Dainius Baublys, deputy representatives, and Mr. Andrius Kalindra, Mr. Gediminas Levickas, Mr. Aleksas Dambrauskas, Ms. Vaida Hampe, Ms. Rasma Ramoškaitė, Ms. Viktorija Budreckaitė, Mr. Mindaugas Grabrėnas, Ms. Agnė Gleveckaitė, Ms. Neringa Juodkaitė Putrimienė, Mr. Aidas Sunelaitis, Mr. Dovydas Špokauskas, Ms. Rūta Jazukevičiūtė, Ms. Solveiga Vailionytė, Ms. Dovilė Petkūnaitė and Ms. Erika Prokofjeva, alternate representatives.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

Nigeria: Credentials from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, signed on 27 December 2013, stating that Mrs. U. Joy Ogwu has been appointed representative of Nigeria on the Security Council, Mr. Usman Sarki, deputy representative, and Mr. Kayode Laro, Mr. Lawal Hamidu, Mr. Abiodun Richards Adejola, Mr. Martin Senkom Adamu, Mrs. Amina Smaila, Mr. Mohammed I. Haidara, Mr. Yakubu Dadu, Mr. Elias Fatile, and Ms. Mercy Clement, alternate representatives.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

United Nations S/2013/577

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 September 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 2104 (2013), in which the Council requested that I continue to inform it of progress in implementing the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), and to bring to its attention any serious violation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area (S/2011/384, annex).

2. The report provides an update on the situation in Abyei as well as on the deployment and operations of UNISFA since my previous report of 29 July 2013 (S/2013/450). In addition, it provides an update on progress made in the implementation of the additional tasks mandated to the Force under Security Council resolutions 2024 (2011) and 2104 (2013) with respect to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.

II. Security situation

3. During the period under review, the security situation in the Abyei Area was generally calm, but remained highly unpredictable. The lack of concrete progress in the establishment of the Abyei Area joint institutions has created a dangerous political and administrative vacuum and tensions have concurrently been rising between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities over the holding of a referendum in October 2013, as proposed by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on 21 September 2012.

4. There were no new incursions by unauthorized elements into the Abyei Area during the reporting period. The Sudan Oil Police, however, maintained approximately 120 to 150 personnel inside the Diffra oil complex in violation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement and Security Council resolutions 1990 (2011), 2032 (2011), 2046 (2012), 2047 (2012), 2075 (2012) and 2104 (2013).

5. Few security incidents related to intercommunal violence took place during the reporting period. The end of the Misseriya migration in July and the overall limitations on movement imposed by the ongoing rainy season minimized the contacts between the two communities. On 6 August, UNISFA troops observed two dead bodies approximately three kilometres north-west of Noong village in central

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Abyei. Witnesses reported that a number of thieves had arrived in the village on that day and attempted to steal cattle. Two of them were killed as a result of retaliatory action taken by local Ngok Dinka residents. The identity of the victims remains unknown and UNISFA is currently investigating the incident. On 13 August, six to seven unidentified armed assailants entered Mikol village, approximately 3 kilometres east of Abyei town, at around midnight, and attacked a Ngok Dinka resident with a machete. According to witnesses whose testimonies are currently being verified by UNISFA, a neighbour came to the resident's rescue and killed one of the assailants with a gun. The witnesses further stated that the deceased assailant was a Ngok Dinka community member who was part of a cross-border criminal group composed of both Ngok Dinka and Misseriya.

6. As part of its mandate to maintain security and protect civilians in the area, UNISFA engaged in disarming of the local communities. On 28 July, four men with two AK-47 rifles and 250 rounds of ammunition were disarmed in Manyang, approximately 10 kilometres south of Abyei town. On 19 August, UNISFA troops disarmed a man carrying one firearm and two bullets at the Farouk checkpoint. In both incidents, UNISFA took custody of the seized weapons, pending the establishment of the joint administration.

7. With the onset of the rainy season and resulting limitations on movement, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) suspended mine clearance operations in the Abyei Area in accordance with its standard operating procedures. The Mine Action Service utilized this period to review and update mine action procedures, prepare for upcoming operations and integrate new staff members into its programme. Consultations are also under way for UNMAS to provide additional training to the Ethiopian demining platoon during the next dry season.

III. Political developments

8. The Sudan and South Sudan made no progress with respect to implementation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement during the reporting period. Following the killing of the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief on 4 May 2013, the Government of South Sudan has consistently refused to participate in any meetings of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee. As a result, the Committee has not met since 2 May 2013. In order to mitigate the tensions deriving from this blockage, the UNISFA Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major-General Yohannes Tesfamariam, urged the Sudan and South Sudan co-chairs of the Committee to maintain open channels of communication and to encourage community leaders to implement the Committee's decision of 2 May to make Abyei a weapon-free area.

9. In the absence of joint temporary institutions, the Government of South Sudan has stated its intention to re-establish its own administrative structures. On 23 August 2013, the South Sudan co-chair of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee issued a written order dismissing four members of the former Abyei Area Administration, which was established under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 and dissolved by Omar al-Bashir, President of the Sudan, following the May 2011 violence between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army. In a second order issued the same day, the South Sudan co-chair appointed a new Abyei community coordinating executive committee and Abyei community coordination council. According to the order, these bodies would

perform functions such as coordination of humanitarian assistance, facilitation of the return of displaced Ngok Dinka, supervision of the provision of social services and, in coordination with UNISFA, maintenance of law, order and peace. The Head of Mission of UNISFA informed the co-chair that, in view of its mandate, the Mission could not work with or support any unilaterally appointed administration.

10. The parties have also made no progress on the resolution of the final status of the Abyei Area. The 21 September 2012 proposal of the High-level Implementation Panel was accepted by the Government of South Sudan but rejected by the Government of the Sudan. Local Ngok Dinka dignitaries and Government of South Sudan officials publicly stated on 23 August, that a referendum should take place in the Abyei Area in October 2013 in accordance with the proposal and have been encouraging the return of the Ngok Dinka population to Abyei for this purpose. On 19 August, the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs of South Sudan issued an order stating that President Salva Kiir had directed that all "citizens of Abyei working in public institutions, whether at the national or state level, should be allowed to take time off in order to go home and register and participate in the said referendum".

11. During the reporting period, the number of Ngok Dinka returnees to areas north of the Kiir/Bahr el-Arab River reached approximately 33,000. On 23 August, UNISFA observed a settlement of 100 to 150 Ngok Dinka youth residing in approximately 70 temporary shelters in the vicinity of Makir, which is located 15 kilometres north-west of Abyei town. The group indicated to the Mission that they had arrived in the Abyei Area from Juba, Wau and other locations in South Sudan in order to take part in the October 2013 referendum. They added that more people were likely to arrive in the coming days, including their families. UNISFA also observed a rise in the population of Agok and the initiation of voter registration programmes by local authorities in Agok.

12. On 25 August, Misseriya community leaders publicly threatened violent action, including war, if a referendum was held in the Abyei Area in October without their participation. The Misseriya leaders also publicly criticized the Government of the Sudan on 30 August over its lack of response to the measures taken by the Government of South Sudan in preparation for the referendum.

13. On 3 September, the joint communiqué that was issued following the summit between President al-Bashir and President Kiir in Khartoum provided a step in the right direction. It stated: "The two parties affirmed the importance of continuing their constructive dialogue for the resolving of the remaining and pending issues including Abyei and the borders. They emphasized the necessity of reaching a speedy agreement on the establishment of civilian institutions in Abyei to pave the way for the two Presidents to reach a final resolution of the issue". Concrete measures now have to be urgently taken by the two Governments to reduce tensions on the ground.

14. Finally, the Abyei Area Joint Investigation and Inquiry Committee, tasked by the African Union Peace and Security Council to investigate the circumstances surrounding the killing of the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief on 4 May 2013, commenced its work on 24 July. Following a brief suspension owing to objections raised by the Government of the Sudan regarding its name and mandate, the Committee resumed its work and conducted visits to Khartoum, Juba, the Abyei Area and al-Muglad (Southern Kordofan, Sudan) from 17 to 26 August. During its visits, the Committee met with Sudan and South Sudan Government officials,

including President Kiir, the Sudanese National Investigation Committee for Abyei Area Security, representatives of the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities, the UNISFA leadership, representatives of humanitarian organizations and various witnesses to the incident in question. On 31 August, the Chair of the Committee, Anil Gayan, asked the African Union Commission for a temporary suspension of the work of the Committee pending translation of records received in Khartoum and al-Muglad. The report will be submitted to the Peace and Security Council when completed.

IV. Status of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism

15. The operationalization of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism continued in accordance with the implementation plan agreed upon between the Sudan and South Sudan within the framework of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism in Addis Ababa on 8 March 2013 (see S/2013/168, annex). The headquarters of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and sector headquarters in Kadugli and Gok Machar are now operational. The expected deployment of the force protection unit will enable the Mechanism to undertake ground verification and monitoring missions and thereby achieve full operational capability. Twenty air reconnaissance missions have been conducted since the activation of the mechanism.

16. Preparations are under way for the deployment of the additional 1,126 troops authorized under Security Council resolution 2104 (2013) for the force protection unit. The force protection unit will be composed of 1,096 military personnel, while the remaining 30 military personnel will be deployed as staff officers to support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. An advance party of 117 troops is expected to be deployed in late October 2013. The remainder of the headquarters elements and two force protection companies with company-owned equipment will follow the advance party as soon as possible. The other two force protection companies with company-owned equipment will be deployed at 60 days' notice.

17. A major obstacle to the full operationalization of the Mechanism remains the parties' dispute over the location of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone centreline in two key locations. The African Union Border Programme Technical Team visited the Mechanism headquarters in Kadugli and two locations within the Zone from 3 to 15 August 2013. The Technical Team was established by the African Union Commission on the basis of the 9 June 2013 proposal from the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to conclusively determine the location of the contested centreline in order to establish border crossing checkpoints and subsequently operationalize the border crossing corridors. The purpose of the Technical Team's visit on this occasion was to determine the centreline in the Heglig-Bentiu and Kosti-Renk corridors and to operationalize them. The Technical Team was accompanied by representatives of the African Union and the national technical teams from the Sudan and South Sudan.

18. The Technical Team successfully completed the first phase of its visit by informing the local communities and authorities about the centreline determination process. However, further progress was obstructed when the team's attempts to erect

beacons to mark the centreline met resistance from Government of South Sudan authorities in the Heglig-Bentiu corridor and from local South Sudan communities in the Kosti-Renk corridor. The UNISFA Head of Mission and Force Commander advised the team's Sudan and South Sudan representatives to report these developments to their respective Governments and to impress upon them the need to immediately withdraw their forces from the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and inform their local authorities of the team's responsibilities.

19. In a letter to the parties dated 30 August, Thabo Mbeki, Chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, suggested that the High-level Committee, in which the Vice-Presidents of the Sudan and South Sudan oversee the implementation of the 27 September 2012 agreements between the two countries, should meet and consider the convening of the Joint Border Commission and other border mechanisms. On 3 September, during their summit meeting in Khartoum, Presidents al-Bashir and Kiir confirmed the importance of supporting and facilitating the mission of the mechanisms proposed by the High-level Implementation Panel, including the determination of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone centreline, in order to establish border corridors that would allow the smooth movement of people, goods and oil, in addition to the cross-border movement of pastoralists.

20. On 7 September, Mr. Mbeki held consultations with President Salva Kiir in Juba. During the meeting, President Kiir confirmed that he would send parliamentarians and dignitaries from Unity and Upper Nile States to the disputed Heglig-Bentiu and Kosti-Renk border crossing corridors to sensitize the population and explain that the determination of the centreline was for security purposes only and had nothing to do with the demarcation of the borderline itself, which remained to be determined.

21. The aerial verification and patrols of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism were suspended on 24 July following a request by the South Sudan team, and subsequently owing to facilitation being provided for the work of the African Union Border Programme Technical Team. The Mechanism resumed aerial verification and monitoring missions on 30 August.

22. UNMAS continued its activities in support of the Mechanism. In coordination with the Mechanism's training unit, UNMAS provided training for Sudanese, South Sudanese and international monitors in demining patrol skills, explosive hazards, health and safety in the field and hostage survival. UNMAS patrol support teams remain deployed in Kadugli and Gok Machar and on standby for emergency mine action tasks. UNMAS also provided support to the African Union Border Programme Technical Team in determining whether there were any mines or explosive remnants of war at border crossing point locations.

V. Humanitarian situation

23. During the reporting period, humanitarian agencies focused primarily on preventive measures to mitigate the impact of the rainy season on vulnerable populations. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations provided rainy season support consisting of foodstuffs, vegetable seeds and hand tools to 2,000 households. The non-food items emergency shelter cluster assisted over 3,000 families with non-food items including plastic sheeting.

24. The International Organization for Migration conducted a verification exercise confirming that between July 2012 and July 2013, 16,080 displaced people returned to 66 villages near or above the Kiir/Bahr el-Arab River. Estimates based on monthly food distributions suggest that an additional 10,000 people returned during the same period to villages below the River Kiir.

25. During the reporting period, the health situation remained normal and stable. However, the lack of health assistance throughout the Abyei Area continues to limit disease surveillance, leaving populations exposed to disease outbreaks. While access by humanitarian organizations from the Sudan has improved, the bulk of assistance comes from South Sudan. Heavy rains throughout the Abyei Area limit humanitarian access to remote locations.

VI. Protection of civilians

26. Pending the establishment of the Abyei Area temporary institutions, UNISFA continued to implement its multifaceted conflict prevention and mitigation strategy, which consists of monitoring, early warning assessments, day-and-night patrols and promotion of dialogue between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities and their interaction with Government officials in Sudan and South Sudan. In implementing this part of its mandate, the mission focused on the current intercommunal tensions and the overall threat of incursions by unauthorized elements into the Abyei Area. With its extensive field presence, constant foot patrols and air reconnaissance missions, the UNISFA military component has thus far been able to prevent an outbreak of intercommunal violence. During the reporting period, the mission's troops remained deployed in all potential flashpoints within the Abyei Area.

27. The parties' failure to establish the temporary institutions, including the Abyei Area Administration and Council and the Abyei Police Service and the resulting administrative and law and order vacuum remains a considerable concern. In order to avert a resulting deterioration in the security situation, UNISFA held a meeting with national monitors of the Joint Military Observer Committee from the Sudan and South Sudan to discuss the negative impact of the absence of these institutions. The representatives from the Joint Military Observer Committee agreed to form neighbourhood watch committees in consultation with the local community leaders in order to protect their respective communities. On 20 August, UNISFA held a meeting with local community leaders and representatives in Diffra in an effort to sensitize them to the importance of maintaining good intercommunal relations and to explain the mission's mandate.

28. There have been no new developments with regard to the operationalization of human rights monitoring in the Abyei Area, as provided for in paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2104 (2013).

VII. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

29. As of 5 September, the UNISFA military component stood at 3,881 of its authorized strength of 5,326. The remaining personnel are earmarked for the

aviation unit and the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism force protection unit, or for service as military observers or staff officers. The troops on the ground remain deployed in accordance with the rainy season concept of operations, whereby air and foot patrols are increased to compensate for the impassability of many roads. The troops have also utilized this period to engage in training exercises in accordance with the UNISFA Force Commander's training directive.

30. Currently, 15 of the 50 authorized police personnel are deployed in UNISFA, including the Senior Police Adviser. The UNISFA police component continued to provide support and to advise the UNISFA Head of Mission and Force Commander, as well as members of the military component, on public order management, crime analysis and community security issues within the Abyei Area. The police personnel deployed in Abyei town and Agok monitored the work of local community-based security networks and alternative justice mechanisms.

31. On 28 August, the United Nations police and UNISFA launched a joint training session for 30 quick response force personnel on crowd control. The purpose of the training is to enhance the mission's capacity to adequately manage crowds and violent demonstrations using minimum authorized force.

VIII. Mission support

32. UNISFA completed the construction of hard-walled prefabricated structures for the remaining 2,700 troops residing in tents. This included the expansion of two camps of the former United Nations Mission in the Sudan and the construction of five new ones. In addition to its headquarters in Abyei town, UNISFA currently has three sector headquarters co-located with three company operating bases. It is expanding another site for the relocation of the logistics company.

33. Nevertheless, critical infrastructure projects have yet to be completed. The main constraint in this regard is the ongoing rainy season and the refusal of Sudanese vendors to deliver laterite and perform other services in the Abyei Area out of fear of reprisal attacks following the 4 and 5 May 2013 security incidents. Critical projects include road improvement, air connectivity and construction of warehousing facilities.

34. UNISFA has signed a contract to build a fixed-wing aircraft landing strip inside the Abyei Area. The contractors have visited the site, completed an assessment and done soil sample testing. The mission has also been helping, on a reimbursement basis, the new rations contractor to complete the food storage facilities in Abyei town.

35. UNISFA continued its efforts to establish the full operating capacity of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. During the reporting period, the sector headquarters in Gok Machar was established. The expansion of the camp designated to accommodate the force protection unit is in progress. Meanwhile, renovation is under way at the Mechanism headquarters in Kadugli to accommodate the force protection advance party. The mission has also established regular flights from Kadugli to Khartoum and from Gok Machar to Abyei town.

36. The mission completed the selection of land for the sector headquarters in Buram and Malakal. The headquarters in Buram will be located adjacent to an

existing team site of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. The headquarters in Malakal will be constructed next to the team site of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. In addition, UNISFA has prepared documents for the site preparation and infrastructure projects in Malakal and for the expansion of the apron at the airport to accommodate three attack helicopters. The project documents have been submitted to the Global Service Centre for clearance.

37. During the reporting period, the Government of the Sudan issued 23 visas to UNISFA personnel (1 international civilian staff, 17 military officers and 5 international contractors).

IX. Financial implications

38. The General Assembly, by its resolution 67/270 of 28 June 2013, appropriated $307.1 million for the maintenance of UNISFA for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014. The additional resources requirements that arise from Security Council resolution 2104 (2013) will be submitted to the General Assembly during the main part of its sixty-eighth session.

39. As of 9 September 2013, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNISFA amounted to $129.8 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $4,778.2 million.

40. Reimbursement to the contributing Government for troop- and contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the periods up to 30 April 2013 and 30 March 2013, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

X. Observations and recommendations

41. The security situation and the status quo in the Abyei Area are becoming increasingly untenable. The ongoing impasse in the implementation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement, the lack of progress in addressing the final status of the Abyei Area and the likelihood that local communities may take matters into their own hands, including by unilaterally organizing a referendum in October 2013, have the potential to escalate into intercommunal violence.

42. The UNISFA Head of Mission and Force Commander has impressed upon the Sudanese and South Sudanese co-chairs of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee the need for it to assume primary responsibility for tempering the growing tendency of both the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities to take security matters into their own hands. It is essential, therefore, that the parties remain in communication on how to approach the issue of intercommunal coexistence pending the determination of the final status of the Abyei Area.

43. I commend the commitment of President al-Bashir and President Kiir to maintaining good neighbourly relations and to further addressing the issues related to the implementation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement in order to pave the way for the resolution of the final status of the Abyei Area. However, in order to avoid deterioration of the security situation in Abyei, the two Presidents must urgently resolve their remaining differences with respect to the 21 September 2012 proposal of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel. I urge the two Governments

to immediately resume meetings of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee to provide guidance for the management of political and administrative matters. I also urge them to commence the establishment of the institutions stipulated in the 20 June 2011 Agreement, as agreed during their last summit meeting.

44. I encourage the Sudan and South Sudan to continue their cooperation with UNISFA for the timely operationalization of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and the full establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone. In particular, both parties must commit themselves to fully implementing their security agreements, including those relating to the determination of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone centreline, and complete redeployment of their respective forces. The full implementation of these agreements is necessary in order to ensure security along their common border. The current deadlock reflects conflation of the temporary establishment of the centreline with the final demarcation of the border. The focus on the issue of the centreline and delays in the discussions on the disputed and claimed areas and demarcation of the border have raised fears in South Sudan that any determination of the centreline would ultimately define the border between the two countries. To resolve this issue, I urge the parties to proceed immediately with the establishment of the Joint Border Commission and move forward with the border demarcation process. The two sides should also exchange their written submissions to the African Union Team of Experts to advance the process relating to the disputed areas.

45. As requested by the Security Council in paragraph 12 of its resolution 2104 (2013), the Secretariat conducted a review of the configuration of UNISFA, the relevant risks and threats and the force posture and troop ceiling required for implementation of the Force's mandate, with a view to a possible reconfiguration (see annex III to the present report). The conclusion of the review is that the current troop ceiling and configuration are necessary and adequate to implement the mission's mandate. I would thus request the extension of the Force's mandate, within the current configuration, for one additional year.

46. Finally, I would like to commend my Special Envoy, Haile Menkerios, and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel led by Thabo Mbeki for their sustained efforts to assist the Sudan and South Sudan in resolving the outstanding issues between them, including those related to Abyei. I also would like to express my gratitude to the UNISFA Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major-General Yohannes Tesfamariam, and his staff for their continued efforts to enhance peace and stability in the Abyei Area and to support the parties in the implementation of their security agreements.

Annex I

Composition of the military component of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (including the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism)

Country	*Description*	*Personnel*	*Total*
Benin	Experts on mission	2	3
	Contingent troop	1	
Bolivia	Experts on mission	2	2
	Contingent troop	–	
Brazil	Experts on mission	2	3
	Contingent troop	1	
Cambodia	Experts on mission	3	3
Ecuador	Experts on mission	1	2
	Contingent troop	1	
Ethiopia	Experts on mission	70	3 826
	Contingent troop	3 756	
Ghana	Experts on mission	3	4
	Contingent troop	1	
Guatemala	Experts on mission	1	1
	Contingent troop	–	
India	Experts on mission	1	3
	Contingent troop	2	
Mongolia	Experts on mission	2	2
Namibia	Experts on mission	3	4
	Contingent troop	1	
Nepal	Experts on mission	2	4
	Contingent troop	2	
Nigeria	Contingent troop	3	3
Paraguay	Experts on mission	1	1
Peru	Experts on mission	1	2
	Contingent troop	1	
Philippines	Contingent troop	1	1
Russian Federation	Contingent troop	2	2
Rwanda	Experts on mission	1	3
	Contingent troop	2	
Sierra Leone	Experts on mission	1	1
Ukraine	Experts on mission	2	2
United Republic of Tanzania	Contingent troop	1	1
Uruguay	Contingent troop	1	1

Country	Description	Personnel	Total
Yemen	Contingent troop	2	4
	Experts on mission	2	
Zambia	Contingent troop	1	1
Zimbabwe	Contingent troop	1	1
Total		**3 880**	**3 880**

Annex II

Deployment of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei


UNISFA
September 2013
SOUTHERN KORDOFAN
NORTHERN BAHR EL GHAZAL
WARRAP
SUDAN
SOUTH SUDAN
UNITY
Abyei
Sector NORTH
Sector CENTER
Sector SOUTH
Battalion sector line
Undetermined international boundary
State boundary
Area of Operation
Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.
The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Map No. 4467 Rev. 16 UNITED NATIONS
September 2013
Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Annex III

Review of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

A. Justification

1. Further to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2104 (2013), the Secretariat conducted a review of the configuration of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), taking into account the outcome of the previous review conducted in February 2013 and the changes in the operational environment since then. The objective of the review was to assess the relevant risks and threats, as well as the force posture and troop ceiling required for the implementation of the Force's mandate, for possible reconfiguration of the Force by the Security Council.

B. Threats

2. UNISFA is operating in an increasingly complex security environment and the security situation remains extremely volatile. The Abyei Area has both internal and external potential sources of conflict. Tensions in the Abyei Area are driven by the following dynamics: (a) intercommunal rivalry between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya stemming from overlapping claims to land, pasture and migratory routes; (b) the failure of the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to implement the 20 June 2011 Agreement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area (S/2011/384, annex); and (c) disagreements between them over the final status of the Abyei Area, including modalities for the Abyei referendum. As a result three main threats that can trigger violence and instability in the Abyei area:

- Intercommunal violence during migrations and obstruction of the central migration corridor
- Threats pertaining to the return of displaced persons
- Incursion/presence of unauthorized forces, including the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

Migration

3. The traditional migration of the Misseriya into and across Abyei takes place between November and June on a yearly basis, along three main corridors. While the migration continues along the eastern and western corridors southwards into Unity State and Northern Bahr el Ghazal State in South Sudan, there have been criminal attacks on the Misseriya and sporadic, small-scale clashes between the local populations and the migrants. The central corridor through the areas in and around Abyei and Agok towns has been obstructed in the past two years and access into Warrap State denied by the State Government for the last five years. These tensions and the resultant insecurity have led the migrants to make increasing efforts over the last two years to stay within the Abyei area during the migration period. In addition, an increase in the return of displaced Ngok Dinka has also exacerbated tensions by increasing the physical proximity between the two communities,

especially during the migration season. Consequently, the area becomes highly populated with mutually hostile populations and vulnerable to insecurity. The areas that were earlier populated by both of them, such as Abyei town, are now completely depleted of Misseriya or Sudanese refugees, including those from Darfur. This situation is a source of recurrent tension and recriminations that could escalate into violence, which has so far been prevented only by virtue of the mission's ability to implement its conflict prevention and mitigation strategy, including the maintenance of strict separation between the local communities and their cattle and intensive patrolling in support of early warning.

Return of displaced persons

4. During the period under review, UNISFA observed a growth in the number of Ngok Dinka returnees in anticipation of the organization of a referendum to determine the final status of Abyei in October 2013. In view of the Misseriya's hostility to the holding of a referendum without inclusion of their right to vote, the likelihood of intercommunal incidents escalating into open confrontation, with the associated loss of lives and political tensions between the Sudan and South Sudan, is very high.

5. The situation is further compounded by the delay in the establishment of the Abyei Area administration and the complete absence of government institutions. The absence of local police has resulted in a law and order vacuum and the steady increase of intracommunal and intercommunal crime.

Incursion by unauthorized forces

6. The events of April 2012 related to the crisis of Heiglig, during which SPLA and SAF perpetrated incursions into Abyei through the Thurpader-Diffra axis and the Mkines-Diffra axis, respectively, illustrated the risk of the Abyei Area being destabilized by incidents occurring in neighbouring border areas. While SAF and SPLA are deployed outside the Abyei Area, they remain in close proximity and can enter in a context of escalating tensions. Armed militia groups are also operating around the area, including "Tora Bora", a militia allegedly affiliated with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement-North and the Justice and Equality Movement, in the north-east corner of Abyei.

C. Force posture

7. The configuration of the UNISFA military component in Abyei is based on three sectors dedicated to prevent conflict, manage migration and deter the re-entry of SAF and SPLA as well as any other armed elements within the boundaries of the Abyei Area. The current configuration is attached as appendix 1. The three motorized battalions are deployed across the Abyei area of operations, one per each sector. The sector headquarters in Sector North and Sector South are located at Diffra and Anthony, while the Sector Centre headquarters was redeployed further north from Abyei to Dokura.

8. UNISFA maintains a robust posture through its permanent presence in company operating bases across its area of operations and retains flexibility, through deployment of temporary operating bases and other mobile deployments, to respond to emerging threats. In order to prevent conflict, UNISFA troops endeavour to

maintain a continuous presence at flash points and create a dynamic separation between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities as the migration passes along three corridors through the Ngok Dinka populated areas. The deployment is dynamic in nature and shifts according to the migratory trends and movement of returnees. Patrols are conducted mainly to create a secure and safe environment, accompany the Misseriya migrants in their southward progression and deter any external or unauthorized military force within the area of responsibility. As a result, all UNISFA troops including reserves are occupied during the dry season, from November to June. The absence of the Abyei Area Administration puts an additional burden on UNISFA troops, who also patrol to maintain law and order.

9. During the rainy season, from June to October, surface communications are adversely affected, necessitating a wet season deployment by UNISFA. While the overall concept remains the same, certain untenable deployment locations are vacated. The season also restricts operational mobility, thereby limiting area domination and monitoring. This is mitigated by increased air and foot patrols. Hence, while the troops' tempo is relatively slow during the rainy season, it is clear that during the dry season, UNISFA troops are overtasked and overstretched.

10. UNISFA has created two composite task forces comprising a tank and artillery company each in Sector North and Sector South (Todach and Banton) to support the motorized battalions in providing credible deterrence against incursion by unauthorized forces. This contingency remains necessary in view of the existing threat assessment. The troops of these units are nevertheless also tasked with patrolling and holding flash points.

11. Currently, one company of tank and one of artillery is deployed at Todach in Sector North to form a composite task force with elements of the motorized battalion for the sector. The task force for Sector South will be deployed to Banton following the construction of accommodation during the forthcoming dry season. The quick response force company is maintained as a reserve in Sector Centre. The enabling units are adequate to meet the requirements of supporting the UNISFA troops, except for the limited horizontal capability of the engineering company.

D. Conclusion

12. There is no significant change in the threat assessment following the last review exercise, which was undertaken in February 2013. The intervening period corresponds to the rainy season in Abyei and has traditionally seen a decrease in the interactions of the communities and as a result in the number of security-related incidents (see appendix 2). However, contrary to past trends, there has been an increase in the number of security-related incidents during this period, each with the risk of escalation related to the armament of both communities. The 4 May 2013 killing of the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief by Misseriya, the 20 May 2013 attack on Sudanese contractors of UNISFA by armed Dinka youth, the 12 June 2013 killing of two Dinkas by armed assailants in two separate incidents followed by cattle rustling and the attack, on the same day, against an oil station at Ajaj, are some of the incidents to be noted in this regard.

13. The situation has been managed and further escalation has been prevented by the firm commitment and timely and in some instances pre-emptive intervention of UNISFA troops, facilitated by their current configuration and strength. In view of

this analysis, the current troop ceiling of UNISFA in Abyei appears necessary and should be maintained to meet the requirements of mandate implementation.

14. Any reduction of troops from Abyei in view of the current security environment would carry significant risks for the mission. These risks include a reduction of the ability of UNISFA to implement its conflict prevention and mitigation strategy during the migration season. This includes maintaining areas of separation between the local communities and their cattle and conducting intensive patrolling. It would also diminish its ability to monitor and provide a deterrent effect and protect the Abyei Area from incursions by unauthorized armed groups and intervene in a timely manner in intercommunal and intracommunal disputes or security incidents. The likelihood of intercommunal incidents escalating into open confrontation, with the associated loss of lives and political tensions between the Sudan and South Sudan, would be very high.

15. Further reviews of the mission's force strength should be contingent upon the progress of the parties in implementation of the 27 September 2012 cooperation agreements, including the establishment of Abyei Area institutions and agreement on the process to determine the Area's final status. It is also recommended that any review of the UNISFA configuration should be planned with consideration of dry season security challenges, including risks associated with the simultaneous Misseriya migration and returns of internally displaced persons.

Appendix 1

UNISFA force configuration

Type	Units	Total	Remarks
Infantry	3 x Battalion	2 586	Motorized
Tank	2 x Companies	138	T-55
Artillery	2 x Batteries	140	122mm Howitzer
Quick reaction force	1 x Company	175	
Engineer company	1 x Company	150	
Multi-role logistic unit	1 x Unit	250	
Aviation unit	1 x Aviation Unit	200	2 Utility and 3 Attack Helicopters
Medical	1 x Level II	63	
Force headquarters company		151	Force headquarters
Staff officers		122	
Military observers		225	Including 90 Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism monitors
Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism force protection unit		1 096	Battalion headquarters + 4 companies
Additional staff officers		30	
Total		**5 326**	

Appendix 2

Chronology of security incidents since 29 May 2013

- 29 May: four Misseriya herders carrying three AK-47 rifles, one G3 rifle and 60 bullets were disarmed in Noong (central Abyei)
- 5 June: UNISFA dismantled a roadblock mounted by four Misseriya youth in Diffra (northern Abyei)
- 7 June: a Misseriya carrying an AK-47 rifle with 19 bullets was disarmed in Farouk (northern Abyei)
- 8 June: six trucks stolen from Sudanese construction company by unknown persons at Abu Gazala were recovered by UNISFA troops and returned to the company
- 9 June: UNISFA increased security patrolling within and around the Abyei town camp following a demonstration by Ngok Dinka youth
- 10 June: a Misseriya carrying an AK-47 rifle was disarmed at Diffra while another Misseriya carrying an AK-47 rifle with 27 bullets was disarmed at Goli (northern Abyei)
- 11 June: 28 Misseriya youths on 14 motorcycles armed with 7 AK-47 rifles, 1 pistol, 10 knives and 149 bullets were trying to loot vehicles on Abu Gazala road (northern Abyei) but were apprehended and disarmed
- 12 June: a fuel station located 62 km east of Diffra town (northern Abyei) exploded and caught fire; the exact cause of the explosion could not be ascertained but local resident informed UNISFA that they had seen approximately 12 people in a pickup truck moving towards the incident site just prior to the explosion
- 1 July: approximately nine unidentified assailants, dressed in army camouflage and armed with AK-47 rifles, attacked and stole around 60 head of cattle and shot dead an Ngok Dinka man, aged 19 years, in Galary village (southern Abyei).
- 28 July: four unidentified men armed with two AK-47 rifles and 250 rounds of ammunition were disarmed at Manyang (southern Abyei)
- 6 August: local resident informed UNISFA robbers attacked Noong village (central Abyei) to steal cattle; they were killed by the local residents
- 13 August: six to seven unidentified armed assailants entered Mikol village (eastern Abyei); one assailant was killed by inhabitants
- 19 August: UNISFA troops disarmed a man carrying one firearm and two bullets at the Farouk checkpoint (northern Abyei)

United Nations S/2013/578

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 November 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of Pakistan on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 18 November 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan stating that Mr. Diyar Khan and Mr. Muhammad Irfan Soomro have been appointed alternate representatives of Pakistan on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

13-56966 (E) 181113

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United Nations S/2013/579

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 September 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 27 September 2013 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that the members of the Security Council have agreed to send a mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia from 3 to 9 October 2013. The mission will be led by Counsellor Alexis Lamek of France and Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki of Morocco (Democratic Republic of the Congo); Ambassador Samantha Power of the United States of America (Rwanda); Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Uganda); and Ambassador Agshin Mehdiyev of Azerbaijan and Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana of Rwanda (Ethiopia). The members of the Council have agreed on the terms of reference of the mission, which are annexed hereto.

The composition of the mission is as follows:

Ambassador Maria Cristina Perceval (Argentina)
Ambassador Gary Francis Quinlan (Australia)
Ambassador Agshin Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan) co-head of mission
Counsellor Zhao Yong (China)
Counsellor Alexis Lamek (France) co-head of mission
Ambassador Gert Rosenthal (Guatemala)
Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg)
Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki (Morocco) co-head of mission
Minister Asim Iftikar Ahmad (Pakistan)
Ambassador Kyung-hoon Sul (Republic of Korea)
Minister Petr Iliichev (Russian Federation)
Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda) co-head of mission
Ambassador Kodjo Menan (Togo)
Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom) co-head of mission
Ambassador Samantha Power (United States) co-head of mission

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gary Francis **Quinlan**
President of the Security Council

Annex

Terms of reference for the Security Council mission to Africa

I. Great Lakes regional elements

1. To recall the commitment of the Security Council to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the region and to emphasize the need to respect fully the principle of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation.

2. To call upon all countries of the region to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring countries, to not interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries, to not harbour persons accused of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law or persons listed by United Nations sanctions regimes and to promote accountability, and to call upon all countries of the region to neither tolerate nor provide assistance or support of any kind to armed groups.

3. To express the strong support of the Security Council for the improvement of relations among the countries of the region and to encourage them to continue reinforcing cooperation in all fields, especially on political, economic and security issues, in order to guarantee the long-term stabilization of the Great Lakes region.

4. To reiterate its support for the implementation of the commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, which is essential for the achievement of lasting peace and security in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, and to call upon all signatories to implement promptly, fully and in good faith their respective commitments.

5. To reiterate that all parties should contribute to stabilizing the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to encourage all countries of the region to work together, and to recall the importance of the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2098 (2013), as a means of stabilizing the situation.

6. To reiterate support for the strengthening of the regional dynamic, including through the development, where appropriate, of economic projects of common interest and the implementation of appropriate steps to facilitate legal trade and put an end to the illegal trafficking of natural resources, as means of consolidating peace and security.

7. To emphasize the continuing concerns of the Council about the protection of civilians, to address the situation of internally displaced persons and to advocate for respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, to address the issue of sexual violence and to strengthen child protection, and to encourage the parties and Governments concerned to ensure that those responsible for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law are brought to justice.

8. To affirm that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a method or tactic of war or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate and prolong situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security, to emphasize in this regard that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts contribute

significantly to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to stress the participation of women as essential to any prevention and protection response.

Additional elements for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (*co-led by Morocco and France*)

9. To acknowledge the primary responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to consolidate peace and stability, to promote recovery and development in the country, to protect civilians and to express the continued support of the Council in this regard.

10. To reiterate its deep concern regarding the fragile security and humanitarian crisis in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo due to the ongoing destabilizing activities of the 23 March Movement (M23), the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and other Congolese and foreign armed groups, and to demand that they immediately cease all forms of violence and destabilizing activities and that their members immediately and permanently disband and lay down their arms.

11. To call upon all Congolese authorities to implement fully and in good faith their commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and especially to intensify their efforts to reform the security sector, to consolidate State authority, to make progress on decentralization and to further the agenda of reconciliation, tolerance and democratization.

12. To express its support for the establishment of a national oversight mechanism by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as requested in the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and in resolution 2098 (2013), and to call upon the Congolese authorities to ensure transparency and effectiveness in this mechanism.

13. To reaffirm the support of the Security Council for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and to receive a briefing on the implementation of resolution 2098 (2013), in particular on the reconfiguration of MONUSCO and the deployment of the intervention brigade, and on the delivery of a road map outlining the transfer of tasks to the fullest extent possible to the United Nations country team, and to receive a briefing on the threat posed to regional stability by armed groups, including M23, FDLR and the Allied Democratic Forces — National Army for the Liberation of Uganda.

14. To get updates on the joint military operations between the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and MONUSCO against M23 and other armed groups, to request further updates on how MONUSCO intends to implement its mandate of neutralizing all armed groups according to resolution 2098 (2013) and on how MONUSCO intends to conduct future disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement efforts, to reaffirm that all military operations should be carried out in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and to take appropriate measures to protect civilians, and to draw insights from the experience of MONUSCO that can inform Council members on current and future peacekeeping operations.

15. To reiterate the continuing concerns of the Council about the protection of civilians, to discuss the implementation of Security Council resolution 2098 (2013),

to address the situation of internally displaced persons and to promote and protect human rights and international humanitarian law, and to address sexual violence and child protection issues, including through the implementation of the action plan on children in armed conflict signed by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2012.

16. To ensure the full participation of women in conflict resolution and peace processes, and to reiterate its recognition of the interrelated nature of the effective protection of civilians, the reduction and removal of the threat of armed groups and comprehensive security sector reform, in particular with regard to the screening and vetting of troops integrated in the Congolese armed forces.

17. To recall the utmost importance of the fight against impunity, notably in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by bringing to justice those who have committed crimes and atrocities.

Additional elements for Rwanda (*led by the United States of America*)

18. To discuss Rwandan concerns in the region, including FDLR, and how they can be addressed while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in the Great Lakes region.

19. To reiterate support for the implementation of the commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, and to call upon all signatories to fulfil their commitments in good faith.

20. To examine the plight of refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo forced to flee by armed groups.

21. To reiterate that all parties should contribute to stabilizing the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to encourage Rwandan and Congolese authorities to work together, in collaboration with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Great Lakes Region and MONUSCO, to ensure the full neutralization, disarmament, demobilization, and cessation of sources of support to armed groups in the region, in the framework of a multidimensional approach aligned with the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, and to recall the importance of the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions as a means of stabilizing the situation.

22. To explore the strengthening of the regional dynamic, including through the creation of peace dividends and the development, where appropriate, of economic projects of common interest.

23. To discuss with the Government of Rwanda the modalities for how the Government, the United Nations and other international organizations can work together to urgently address the situation of the former M23 combatants interned in eastern Rwanda since March 2013, including individuals designated by the Security Council, and to ensure that they are permanently demobilized and dealt with in accordance with relevant international law, with special attention given to children and women among them.

Additional elements for Uganda (*led by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*)

24. To reiterate the support of the Security Council for the improvement of relations among the countries of the region, to encourage them to strengthen cooperation in all fields, and to discuss regional efforts in that regard.

25. To discuss Ugandan concerns in the region, including the Allied Democratic Forces, and how they can be addressed while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in the Great Lakes region.

26. To emphasize the support of the Security Council for action against armed groups in the region, including the Lord's Resistance Army.

II. African Union (*co-led by Azerbaijan and Rwanda*)

27. To strengthen partnership and enhance cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations through an exchange of views on issues of interest to both the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, in accordance with resolution 2033 (2012).

28. To exchange views and explore ways of reinforcing and supporting the conflict prevention tools of the African Union.

29. To exchange views on situations of interest to both the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, namely:

(a) The situation in the Great Lakes region;

(b) The situation in the Sudan and South Sudan;

(c) The situation in Somalia;

(d) The situation in the Central African Republic;

(e) The situation in the Sahel region.

United Nations S/2013/580

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 September 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 27 September 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit a communication dated 27 September 2013 from the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ahmet Üzümcü, forwarding a decision of the Executive Council of the Organization entitled "Decision on destruction of Syrian chemical weapons", dated 27 September 2013 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

Letter dated 27 September 2013 from the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to the Secretary-General

The Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons convened today to consider matters related to the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons.

The Council has adopted a decision entitled "Decision on destruction of Syrian chemical weapons", dated 27 September 2013, which endorses an accelerated programme for the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria. I have the pleasure to hereby transmit a copy of the decision (see enclosure).

I look forward to our mutual cooperation in the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons.

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons decision

Decision on destruction of Syrian chemical weapons

The Executive Council,

Recalling that following its thirty-second meeting, 27 March 2013, the Chairperson of the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") issued a statement (EC-M-32/2/Rev.1, dated 27 March 2013) expressing "deep concern that chemical weapons may have been used in the Syrian Arab Republic", and underlining that "the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances would be reprehensible and completely contrary to the legal norms and standards of the international community";

Recalling also that the Third Review Conference (RC-3/3*, 19 April 2013) expressed "deep concern that chemical weapons may have been used in the Syrian Arab Republic and underlined that use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances would be reprehensible and completely contrary to the legal norms and standards of the international community";

Noting the report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013 (S/2013/553, dated 16 September 2013) prepared by the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, dated 13 September 2013, which concludes that "chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, also against civilians, including children, on a relatively large scale";

Condemning in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons;

Welcoming the Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons agreed upon by the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 14 September 2013 (EC-M-33/NAT.1, dated 17 September 2013);

Noting also that on 12 September 2013, in its communication to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Syrian Arab Republic notified its intention to apply the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (hereinafter "the Convention") provisionally;

Noting further that on 14 September 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations its instrument of accession to the Convention and declared that it shall comply with its stipulations and observe them faithfully and sincerely, applying the Convention provisionally pending its entry into force for the Syrian Arab Republic, which was notified to all States parties by the depositary on the same date (C.N.592.2013.TREATIES-XXVI.3), and taking into account that the depositary received no communications to the contrary from the States parties with regard to this declaration;

Noting further that the Convention enters into force for the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 October 2013;

Recognizing the extraordinary character of the situation posed by Syrian chemical weapons and determined to ensure that the activities necessary for the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons programme start immediately pending the formal entry into force of the Convention with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic, and are conducted in the most rapid and safe manner;

Recognizing also the invitation of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to receive immediately a technical delegation from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and to cooperate with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in accordance with the provisional application of the Convention prior to its entry into force for the Syrian Arab Republic, and noting the designation by the Syrian Arab Republic to the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") of its National Authority;

Emphasizing that the provisional application of the Convention gives immediate effect to its provisions with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic;

Noting further that the Syrian Arab Republic submitted on 19 September 2013 the detailed information, including names, types and quantities of its chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location and form of storage, production and research and development facilities;

Noting further that pursuant to paragraph 36 of article VIII of the Convention, the Council, following its consideration of doubts or concerns regarding compliance and cases of non-compliance, shall, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, bring the issue or matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council;

Taking into account the Agreement concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of 17 October 2000;

Strongly urging all remaining States not party to the Convention to ratify or accede to it as a matter of urgency and without preconditions, in the interests of enhancing their own national security as well as contributing to global peace and security; and

Recalling that, pursuant to paragraph 8 of article IV and paragraph 10 of article V of the Convention, a State acceding to the Convention after 2007 shall destroy its chemical weapons and its chemical weapons production facilities as soon as possible, and the Council shall determine the "order of destruction and procedures for stringent verification" of such destruction;

Hereby:

1. *Decides* that the Syrian Arab Republic shall:

   (a) Not later than seven days after the adoption of this decision, submit to the Secretariat further information, to supplement that provided on 19 September 2013, on the chemical weapons as defined in paragraph 1 of article II of the Convention that the Syrian Arab Republic owns or possesses, or has under its jurisdiction or control, in particular:

(i) The chemical name and military designator of each chemical in its chemical weapons stockpile, including precursors and toxins, and quantities thereof;

(ii) The specific type of munitions, sub-munitions and devices in its chemical weapons stockpile, including specific quantities of each type that are filled and unfilled; and

(iii) The location of all of its chemical weapons, chemical weapons storage facilities, chemical weapons production facilities, including mixing and filling facilities, and chemical weapons research and development facilities, providing specific geographic coordinates;

(b) Not later than 30 days after the adoption of this decision, submit to the Secretariat the declaration required by article III of the Convention;

(c) Complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014, subject to the detailed requirements, including intermediate destruction milestones, to be decided by the Council not later than 15 November 2013;

(d) Complete as soon as possible and in any case not later than 1 November 2013, the destruction of chemical weapons production and mixing/filling equipment;

(e) Cooperate fully with all aspects of the implementation of this decision, including by providing the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons personnel with the immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites in the Syrian Arab Republic; and

(f) Designate an official as the main point of contact for the Secretariat and provide him or her with the authority necessary to ensure that this decision is fully implemented.

2. *Decides further* that the Secretariat shall:

(a) Make available to all States parties, within five days of its receipt, any information or declaration referred to in this decision, which shall be handled in accordance with the Annex to the Convention on the Protection of Confidential Information;

(b) As soon as possible and in any case not later than 1 October 2013, initiate inspections in the Syrian Arab Republic pursuant to this decision;

(c) Inspect not later than 30 days after the adoption of this decision, all facilities contained in the list referred to in paragraph 1 (a) above;

(d) Inspect as soon as possible any other site identified by a State party as having been involved in the Syrian chemical weapons programme, unless deemed unwarranted by the Director-General, or the matter resolved through the process of consultations and cooperation;

(e) Be authorized to hire, on a short-term basis, qualified inspectors and other technical experts and to rehire, on a short-term basis, inspectors, other technical experts, and such other personnel as may be required whose term of service has recently expired, in order to ensure efficient and effective implementation of this decision in accordance with paragraph 44 of article VIII of the Convention; and

(f) Report to the Council on a monthly basis on implementation of this decision including progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of this decision and the Convention, activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic, and its needs for any supplementary resources, particularly technical and personnel resources.

3. *Decides further*:

(a) To consider, on an urgent basis, the funding mechanisms for activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic, and to call upon all States parties in a position to do so to provide voluntary contributions for activities carried out in the implementation of this decision;

(b) To meet within 24 hours if the Director-General reports delay by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of this decision or the Convention, including, inter alia, the cases referred to in paragraph 7 of part II of the Annex to the Convention on Implementation and Verification, or a lack of cooperation in the Syrian Arab Republic or another problem that has arisen with regard to the implementation of this decision and at that meeting to consider whether to bring the matter, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with paragraph 36 of article VIII of the Convention;

(c) To remain seized of the matter; and

(d) To recognize that this decision is made due to the extraordinary character of the situation posed by Syrian chemical weapons and does not create any precedent for the future.